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NATO has proven itself to be a most stable and success-
ful organization for peace. However, the world today is
far different from when the alliance was formed thirty-two
years ago, and many relationships have changed. As Western
Europe has developed from World War II, it has attained a
large measure of economic and political stability. It has
evolved into a major power center. The US, meanwhile, has
seen a decline in its ability to defend its changing
national interests. Therefore, the central objective of
this thesis is to analyze the relationships between NATO
and Western Europe and relate those findings to an assess-
ment of current US national interests. The thesis will
propose four US conventional force level options toward
NATO in the 19 80s and will conclude with the recommended
implementation of one of the four options. The ultimate
question asked by this thesis is: "Could the US better
insure militarily the defensibility of its current overall
national interests by redefining its current role in NATO?"
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The central objective of this thesis is to analyze the
relationships between NATO and Western Europe and relate
those findings to an assessment of current US national
interests. The thesis will propose four US conventional
force level options toward NATO in the 1980s and will con-
clude with the recommended implementation of one of the four
options presented herein. The ultimate question asked by
this thesis is: "Could the US better insure militarily the
defensibility of its current overall national interests by
redefining its current role in NATO?" The following
quotations introduce and establish this work's fundamental
tone:
Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us
have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must
emerge in frequent controversies, the causes of which
are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, there-
fore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves,
by artificial ties, in ordinary vicissitudes of her
policies or the ordinary combinations and collisions of
her friendships and enmities.
George Washington
Farewell Address, 1796
You cannot ask us to take sides against arithmetic.
You cannot ask us to take sides against the obvious




The commonest error in politics is sticking to the
carcasses of dead policies. When a mast falls over-
board you do not try to save a rope here and a spar
there in memory of their former utility; you cut away
the hamper altogether. And it should be the same with
a policy. But it is not so. We cling to the shred of
an old policy after it has been torn to pieces; and to
the shadow of the shred after the rag itself has been
thrown away.
Lady Gwendolen Cecil
Life of Robert Marquis of
Salisbury
, 1921
The United States, prior to World War II, was an
isolationist nation. Except for a brief interlude in World
War I and its subsequent disarmament conferences, the US
remained isolationist until its entrance into World War II.
However, this prolonged US isolationism was selective in
nature as it did not apply to the international economic
arena. An example of this was the US's opening of relations
with Japan in the 1860s. While on the surface this event
may appear to have been non-isolationist, it was executed
solely to open a new economic market for the US. The actual
reasons for US isolationism are deep-rooted within the
history of the United States. Washington's Farewell
Address attempted to instill in Americans a sense of pride
in being American and that all Americans should consider
themselves a part of a unique nation that was not tied to
the banners of any other nation, yet always prepared for
war. [Ref. 1] Additionally, other founding fathers
stressed that future generations of Americans should resist
the efforts of any and every nation to intermingle in the
10

internal policies of the US. In addition to Washington's
Farewell Address, the Monroe Doctrine, Thomas Paine' s Common
Sense
,
and Thomas Jefferson's "Doctrine of Two Spheres"
are examples of our founding father's attempts to influence
future American thought. [Ref. 2] Further, John Adam's work
as the chief architect of the Model Treaty was of
particular importance as it allowed the US to initially
establish a policy of isolationism that was selective in
its nature. This was because the treaty stated that
"America's contacts with outside powers should be limited
to trade relations." [Ref. 3] Thomas Paine *s pamphlet
Common Sense
,
published in 1796, was also of particular
importance as its acceptance in America signified America's
want to establish a unique isolationist foreign policy.
Paine 's work was based on his criticism of the English
Constitution of the time and his desires for America not to
inherit the monarchial constitution's faults. [Ref. 4]
Therefore, largely because of our founding father's efforts,
America remained isolationist for 16 9 years.
Until World War II, the worldwide view of the US was
that it was not a regular participant in world affairs and
that it only intervened in great emergencies. Although
President Wilson attempted, after World War I, to change this
view by attempting to engage the United States into a
dominant role within the international arena, he was ulti-
mately defeated by the traditional view. [Ref. 5] Therefore,
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during the twenty year hiatus between world wars, the US
seemingly jeopardized its national interests by opting not
to join the League of Nations, not forming alliances, and
not extending aid to friendly foreign nations. The US
entrance into World War II reversed all of these trends.
During the thirty-six year period after World War II,
the Western nations, led by the US, adopted a foreign
policy doctrine based upon three formulas: opposition to
aggression, containment of communism, and defense of free
nations. [Ref. 6] The major factors that led to the adop-
tion of this policy doctrine were the breakdown of the
wartime alliances, the rapid expansion of Soviet influence
in Eastern Europe, and the perception of communism as being
a monolithic world movement. These factors were quickly
encouraged by a changed American attitude toward inter-
national relations and the international environment that
stressed the overall equality of domestic and international
politics and that there was truly a lack of a logical
sequence between war and peace. [Ref. 7] This new attitude
signaled the first real change in US public opinion
concerning the US's role in the international arena.
Because of this, US isolationism has seemingly become a
policy of the past. US policy, since World War II, has
been anything but isolationist.
As part of the containment policy doctrine of limiting
communism within the boundaries of those nations that were
12

under communist leadership immediately and shortly after
the conclusion of World War II, the US opted to link its
national security to Western Europe by expanding the March
1948 Brussels Treaty into the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) in April 1949. [Ref. 8] While the US
remains an integral part of the NATO Alliance, three
fundamental changes in the past thirty years have been
critical as we enter the decade of the 1980s. The first
change, which deals with nuclear weapons, had three separate
aspects. These are: the technological changes which have
resulted in improved nuclear weapons and delivery systems;
the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and the parity of
nuclear weapons' capabilities between the US and the Soviet
Union (USSR) . Second, the emergence of other power centers
such as Western Europe, Japan, and the People's Republic of
China (PRC) which challenged the previous bi-polar structure
based on the US and USSR. And finally, the perception of
communism as not being monolithic, which was highly influ-
enced by Soviet actions against its satellites in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia, open hostilities with the PRC, and the
recent rapid growth of the Eurocommunist movement in Western
Europe. [Ref. 9] During this same period, the US has
witnessed the dissolution of alliances such as the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO) , internal problems within the
NATO Alliance, and a growing acceptance that National Wars




The Western Europe of today finds itself tied to the
NATO Alliance, facing a military opponent whose conventional
superiority is seldom questioned, worried about a possible
Finlandization in its territory should the military balance
further erode, and plagued by a political unwillingness to
make the sacrifices necessary to potentially correct the
situation. Western Europe's natural relationship to NATO is
the single most important reason for Western Europe's current,
and past, political passivity. [Ref. 11] As argued by
Francois Duchene, an entire generation of West Europeans has
not been exposed to or accepted the responsibilities
associated with an independent security policy and this same
generation sees the Soviet threat as progressively dimin-
ishing. [Ref. 12] William Pfaff states: "Europeans do not
quite believe that the Soviet Union poses a very serious
threat to them; since the Americans are still in Europe they
can also excuse themselves from worrying over the conse-
quences of being wrong." [Ref. 13] This European attitude
is conditioned by the fact that, since the 1840s, they have
grown accustomed to the traditional Russian tactic of
maintaining ground forces, deployed towards Western Europe,
that are far larger numerically than past, or present,
situations would seem to justify. [Ref. 14]. Because of
the different perspectives, strains have been occurring in
the Atlantic Alliance which undermine the political, social,




B. NATO'S DEVELOPMENT AND EARLY YEARS (1945-1967)
The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San
Francisco, shortly after the collapse of Nazi Germany, by
the representatives of 50 nations on June 26, 1945. Two
assumptions provided the foundation for the charter. First,
that China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and the Soviet Union, who had the five permanent seats on
the UN Security Council, would be able to agree on matters
of importance. Secondly, that none of these five powers
would attempt to increase its present territories. [Ref. 15]
It was quickly shown that neither of these assumptions was
correct. The Soviet Union almost immediately took advantage
of the post-war power vacuums, utilizing the Red Army and
the power of world communism, by continuing expansionist
policies. The Western Nations, basically because of war-
time pledges and domestic pressures, decided to disarm.
[Ref. 16]
On the day that Germany surrendered, the American armed
strength in Europe amounted to 3,100,000 men: within
one year it had melted to 391,000. On VE Day the
British armed strength in Europe was 1,321,000: one
year later there were only 488,000 left. On VE Day
Canada had 2 99,000 men in Europe: within a year they
had all gone home. How futile the good faith of the
Western powers and their sincere efforts to cooperate
with Soviet Russia were to prove. [Ref. 17]
By 1949, the Soviet Union had increased its wartime
expansion, which had included outright annexation of
Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and areas of Finland, by
adding Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Eastern Germany, Poland,
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Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to the Soviet bloc satellites.
These countries were firmly bound to Moscow by a series of
political, economic, and military agreements. To stem this
tide, the US Congress responded in June 1948 with $400
million for aid to Greece and Turkey. This was done under
the auspices of the Truman Doctrine, which called for the
US to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures." In
the face of the threat of an expansionistic Russia and its
4,500,000 man armed forces, the free Western countries of
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Brussels in March 1948.
The treaty set up a joint defensive system and proposed the
strengthening of the signing countries' economic and
cultural ties. From this treaty, and encouraged by the
Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 194 8, the Western Union
Defense Organization was created in September 1948. Its
peacetime existence was proof for the US and Canada that the
member countries were determined to combine to resist
aggression. Meanwhile, the Canadians, led by Canadian House
of Commons member St. Laurent, and the Americans, led by
Secretary of State Marshall and Senators Vandenberg and
Connally, had constitutionally freed their respective
governments to join collective arrangements in the interest
of national security. These events climaxed on April 4, 1949,
when the Brussels Treaty was simultaneously included and
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superseded with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in
Washington. [Ref. 18]
In NATO's first 15 years, US hegemony was undisputed in
the conduct of NATO military affairs. Military force
improvements and modernization occurred only because of US
leadership and generally after the Korean War had concluded.
The Korean War acted as an accelerator for NATO's early
development as the war's implications as to Soviet inten-
tions helped to speed up the appointment of the first
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) , General
Eisenhower, and according to others, helped "put the into
NATO." During this same timeframe, our West European allies
were primarily concerned with legitimatizing their respective
governments, rebuilding their nations' social fabric, and
establishing their place in the world economy. Because of US
superiority in strategic nuclear capability and the perceived
technological qualitative edge over the Soviets in conven-
tional military equipment, the allies were willing to place
increasing reliance on the US for their security. Yet at the
same time they felt obligated to contribute a fair share of
their economic resources to defense in order to retain a
maximum US presence. [Ref. 19]
NATO's first strategy was based solely on nuclear
deterrence as the US ' s sending of B-2 9s to Britain during the
June 48 to May 49 Soviet blockade of West Berlin illustrates.
In April 1950, National Security Council Document Number 68
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(NSC-68) called for an extensive buildup of US military
capabilities. However, the document's overall acceptance
was not obtained until after the June 1950 invasion by
North Korea into South Korea. This document, assisted by
the Korean War, not only became a "call to arms," it sped up
the appointment of General Eisenhower as the SACEUR and
forced NATO, for the first time, to develop some concrete
military strategies. [Ref. 20] This need for a cohesive
NATO military strategy resulted in three highly criticized
1950 plans. The first of these, the Short-Term Plan, was
the plan for the immediate future. When SHAPE (Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) was established in 1951,
the plan was apparently ignored though it undoubtedly
remained available for a short period as a contingency of
some sorts. The plan's general outline follows:
The Short-Term Plan was an emergency plan and its
purpose was principally to save as many of the troops
as possible in the event of war. It amounted to little
more than assignments to withdrawal routes, the
authority to commandeer ships in British and Allied
ports to be used for evacuation, and perhaps a desperate
hope—which was never expressed—that Franco might let
the Allied troops pass through Spain or even stand with
them in an attempt to hold at the Pyrenees. [Ref. 21]
The Medium-Term Defense Plan was hampered by the conven-
tional force posture of the period and a lack of an
adequate logistical infrastructure. The lack of adequate
armor or heavy artillery forces was further exacerbated by
ammunition shortages and British and American supply lines
that ran parallel to the front from Hamburg to Bremerhaven.
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These supply lines were, in many instances, within a few
miles of Soviet armor. The plan's general outline follows:
The Medium-Term Defense Plan was a battle plan, looking
forward to the day when the Allies would have some
portion of the troops they needed and, more importantly,
when they would have the logisitical back-up to permit
deployment as a fighting force. Before the attack on
South Korea in 1950, NATO had only twelve divisions,
400 airplanes, and a very small number of naval vessels.
Most of these troops were poorly equipped and trained.
They were deployed not for defense, but for occupation.
The British and Americans were scattered in penny
packets in Northern and Southern Germany, respectively,
and the French were far to the rear, in the Rhineland
and the Black Forest. [Ref. 22]
Finally, the Long-Term Plan was based on the premise that the
war would be won or lost on the old traditional Western
Front, which extended from Basle to the mouth of the Rhine-
Ijssel. The plan's general outline follows:
The Long-Term Plan was not a battle plan, but one of
requirements, an analysis of the forces needed to defend
Europe in a major war. In such a war, the main Soviet
thrust would have to come as all attacks on Western
Europe had come—across the North German Plain. A
secondary attack could be expected on Italy, in the
Brenner-Trieste area, as well as on Scandinavia. [Ref. 23]
Largely because of these plans, NATO attempted to "close
the gap" between the roughly 100 divisions required to
defend itself and the total number of divisions that member
NATO countries were willing to put up. This attempt came in
the form of the 1952 Lisbon Conference which called for NATO
to organize upwards to 96 divisions. However, this require-
ment was dropped the following year to roughly 35 divisions
in order to rely more heavily on the use of tactical nuclear
weapons if the conventional forces could not "hold the line."
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The failure to "close the gap" conventionally was a major
military consideration in the rearming of the FRG and their
entrance into NATO in 1955. However, the major political
considerations were the real determining factors involved
in the FRG's joining of the alliance. These were the un-
willingness of the other NATO members to carry the conven-
tional burden by themselves and their conviction that it was
the prudent thing to do at the time. [Ref. 24] During this
period, the alliance came to rely on a "forward" defense
composed of regular forces that formed a "tripwire," which
still exists today, that could launch NATO's nuclear weapons
if the conventional forces proved to be ineffective. At the
same time, NATO's overall strategy switched from one of
matching the Warsaw Pact man-for-man into one of deterrence,
relying on the "tripwire" type forward defense and the
threat of nuclear war.
In 1961, the Kennedy Administration attempted to change
this by seeking to further control the nuclear mode and
building up the conventional mode. After establishing in
its minds that the Soviet threat was overstated, the Kennedy
Administration introduced the "firebreak" concept (The
"firebreak" concept is the same as the nuclear threshold and
both refer to that point in modern warfare where nuclear
weapons are introduced. ) which implied that there was a
definite step required by decision makers in the introduc-
tion of nuclear weapons that would make nuclear wars far
20

more complex than conventional wars. Therefore, the US
idea was to defend NATO conventionally for a protracted time
with the help of conventional reinforcements from the NATO
members who would beef up the conventional forces prior to a
Warsaw Pact invasion. The reinforcements would be effective
because of the belief, at the time, that NATO would have a
23 day warning prior to attack. Because of this, the 1960s
NATO troop conventional force levels fell from approxi-
mately 400,000 to less than 300,000. In 1967, the NATO
Council approved the "firebreak" concept and the much
publicized and still current "flexible response" doctrine.
The "flexible response" doctrine is based on the NATO
conventional forces fighting until defeated after which
NATO's theater nuclear weapons will be employed, to include
the first use of nuclear weapons, to restore the alliance's
credibility.
C. THE LOST DECADE
General Alexander M. Haig and others have described the
period 1964-1974 as NATO's "Lost Decade." [Ref. 25] The
reasons for this are basically threefold. First, the US
belief that Vietnam was vital to our national interests
caused the US to surrender its leadership role in NATO.
The majority of US forces, resources, and above all leader-
ship was dedicated to the Vietnam Conflict. This relegated
the operation of the alliance and the maintenance of US
forces in Europe to a secondary position -. During the
21

conflict, US force improvements were made unilaterally and
with an emphasis on procuring materials that would enhance
our success in Vietnam. Second, our Western European
allies were facing growing social demands at home. This
caused them to reduce defense expenditures (See Table 1)
and force commitments wherever possible and to rely on US
strategic nuclear forces and a perceived qualitative
superiority in conventional weapons.
TABLE 1
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES









































Third and finally, the USSR, not hampered by large
commitments to the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) , continued
to improve its force modernization to close the qualitative
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technological gap with the West. At the same time, they
drastically increased their emphasis on force modernization
and increased the quality of weaponry. [Ref. 26] Table 2
vividly reinforces these points. Meanwhile, the NATO
Alliance neglected much needed force modernization programs
Neither the allies nor the US predicted such a dramatic
Soviet improvement in the qualitative or quantative status
of their conventional forces. [Ref. 27]
Table 2 shown on page 24
D. THE CARTER INITIATIVES
As the Vietnam Conflict came to its conclusion, the US
military focus once again returned to Europe. The assign-
ment of General Alexander Haig as the SACEUR in 1974 began
a period of alarming pronouncements concerning the status
of the NATO conventional force posture. Two themes were
evident. First, the continuing increase in Soviet
modernization especially in the degree of qualitative
improvements in their conventional forces. Secondly, the
deteriorated state of Western conventional forces in
relationship to the Soviets due to the failure of the
allies t o take the lead while the US was involved in
Vietnam. [Ref. 28]
In order to seize the initiative and to re-assert US
leadership in the alliance, General Haig initiated the
SACEUR Flexibility Studies in 1976. [Ref. 29] These
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1. U.S OUTLAYS EXCLUDE RETIREMENT PAY. INCLUDE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND COAST GUARD
DEFENSE OUTLAYS
2. ESTIMATED SOVIET COSTS ARE BASED ON WHAT IT
WOULD COST THE U.S. TO PRODUCE AND MAN THE
SOVIET MILITARY FORCE AND OPERATE IT AS
THE SOVIETS DO.
3. PROJECTIONS ARE BASED ON 3% ANNUAL REAL
GROWTH FOR USSR, FOR US REAL GROWTH IN
OUTLAYS AS PROJECTED BY FYDP
Source: FY 1981 US Defense Budget (Washington




equipment in each of the NATO regions and to determine the
appropriate actions necessary to improve the alliance's war
fighting capability. This was done to bring the alliance's
conventional forces to a credible level to meet the
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requirements of the flexible response strategy. Most of
the studies 1 recommendations were considered to be "low"
or "no cost" by US definition while others, such as the
increased prepositioning of equipment (POMCUS) , carried a
"high" cost. [Ref . 30] General Haig stated that "it was
these studies which enabled us in the short period of a
year to bring together what I call a very cohesive, long
range requirements plan." [Ref. 31] SACEUR's findings were
endorsed by President Carter and confirmed by three
additional studies (Nunn-Bartlett Report, Hollingsworth
Report, and the Close Study) which emphasized the need for
increased defense expenditures on conventional force
modernization to raise the nuclear threshold. [Ref. 32]
While the different studies may have produced a military
consensus, they did not apparently produce a political one
as Table 3 illustrates.
TABLE 3
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES
EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP
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Source: The Military Balance, 1979-1980 (London:
Adlard & Son Ltd., Bartholemew Press, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 94.
Attempting to obtain a political consensus to increase
defense expenditures, the Carter Administration at the May
1977 London NATO Ministerials Conference and again at the
May 1978 Washington Ministerials Conference urged the
adoption of a three-part program, which had been approved
previously by the NATO Military and Defense Planning
Committees to correct current force imbalances and to set
the trend for the 1980s. The program called for the
adoption of three short-term measures in readiness, anti-
tank ammunition stocks, and reinforcement, the development
of a ten-part Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) to meet the
needs of the 1980s, and commitment of each member nation to
an annual increase in defense spending of three percent in
real terms. [Ref. 33]
The increasing need for a political consensus was
reinforced in January 1980, when the former President
issued the Carter Doctrine in response to the Soviet
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. The doctrine
commits the US to the use of military force, if necessary,
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to repel "any attempt by an outside force to gain control
of the Persian Gulf region." [Ref. 34] With the majority
of US conventional forces, both in Europe and the US,
committed to NATO or Korea, the remaining army and marine
corps divisions, certainly less than six, available for
commitment to meet the requirements of the Carter Doctrine
seems to be inadequate. Combined with available US Air
Force and Navy transport assets, these remaining units
appear to be totally inadequate at the present time to
counter any massive Soviet move to reach the warm waters of
the Persian Gulf. As defense analyst F.D. Ikle stated
little over a year ago: "If push came to shove, we would
lack the forces to 'repel' any attempt to gain control of
the Persian Gulf region as the President. .. said we would."
[Ref. 35]
Therefore, the military planner is faced with a serious
problem. The one and a half war strategy developed in the
early 1970s virtually ignored the Middle East by concentra-
ting on improving NATO's conventional force posture.
[Ref. 36] However, the current and projected US reliance on
Middle East oil (See Tables 4 and 5) , as well as our
increasing need for imported raw materials, when combined
with the Soviet move into Afghanistan and increasing Soviet
presence worldwide has forced the US to redefine its one and
a half war strategy with the half war now being the Persian






US CANADA EUROPEAN NATO NATO
Oil as a percent of
domestic energy
consumption. 50 43 74 57
Oil imports as a
percent of total oil
consumption. 39 24 97 62
Energy Vulnerability
Index. .2 .1 .7 .35
Source: Handbook of Economic Statistics (Washington
US National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979)
TABLE 5
US OIL IMPORTS BY SOURCE
MAY 1979
SOURCE PERCENT












Source: FY 1981 US Defense Budget (Washington: US





If the Reagan Administration is serious about having a
credible one and a half war strategy, it may be time for the
US to rethink its commitment to NATO. With the declining US
birthrate, general public opposition to conscription, and
the increasing cost of maintaining the defense establishment,
the US will be hard pressed to meet the half war strategy
that the Persian Gulf dictates.
Having now briefly looked at the necessary background
required for an analysis of The NATO Alliance: US
Conventional Force Level Options Toward it Based on US
National Interests , the remainder of this thesis will focus
on US national interests, Warsaw Pact and NATO assessments,
NATO Europe's economic power potential, current US con-
ventional force level options toward NATO, and a conclusion




II. US NATIONAL INTERESTS
Today, the question of US national interests is a
dilemna. This is due to both the complexity of the subject
and the fact that US national interests represent the
ultimate belief standard of the US populace. Because of the
latter fact, US national interests have appeared to be
quite loosely defined in recent years. Therefore, this
chapter's effort will be directed at thoroughly defining the
concept of US national interest. From this definition, I
will define what I consider to be the six most important
current US national interests. These six prioritized US
national interests will be derived at fully realizing that
some of the identified interests may only be temporary due
to changing US executive branch policy goals and/or
differing perspectives on the future assessment of the
worldwide threat.
One cannot intelligently define the concept of national
interest without first discussing and defining the concept
of public interest. Although the public interest is
normally only relevant to the domestic sector and the
national interest normally only relevant to the inter-
national sector, it is generally believed that they are
part of the same process in democratic countries. There-
fore, the public interest cannot be separated from the
30

national interest in democratic countries like the US.
Because of this, the first step in defining the concept of
US national interest is to define the concept of US public
interest. The published works of Richard E. Flathman and
Glendon E. Schubert will be utilized as the primary sources
in defining the concept.
Richard E. Flathman, who I will use as the cornerstone
of my definition of the concept, in his book The Public
Interest , states that the concept of public interest is at
the center of the value dimensions of politics and is,
therefore, of primary importance in political theory. The
concept also performs a specific function in political
discussion and possesses a logic which places definable
constraints upon public policy. Flathman* s definition of
public interest is that it is a normative standard and
because of this simple definition it raises "the whole
panoply of problems associated with standards in general."
[Ref. 38] He also reflects on the origin of the term
"public interest" as follows:
"Public Interest" is now commonplace in political
discourse, but it is a relatively recent innovation,
earlier writers having preferred such terms as "public
good" or "commonweal." The replacement of "good" or
"weal" with "interest" is of more than linguistic
importance. In significant respects allying "public"
with "interest" rather than with "good" reflects sub-
stantive changes in political thinking which alter
the problems surrounding the selection and justifica-
tion of public policy. Writers such as Jeremy Benthan
(around 1847) adopted "public interest" as the
standard of public policy and drew the predictable
inference concerning its content. That is: "The
interest of the community then is, what?" Answer:
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(The sum of the interests of the several members who
compose it) . From this point of view there is little
in political life that does not revolve around the
concept of interest. [Ref. 39]
Although Flathman's basic definition of the concept
appears to be quite simple, the procedures he proposes for
determining "what is" and "what is not" in the public
interest is anything but simple. The starting point, in the
determination of the public interest, is the individual
interest, which is divided into two groups (self-regarding
interests and other-regarding interests) . Self-regarding
interests, which can be either subjectively or objectively
defined, refer to an individual's own profit or advantage
and do not fit into Flathman's definition if they are for
the selfish pursuit of one's own welfare. Other-regarding
interests refer to an individual's interest in the profit,
advantage, or welfare of others. [Ref. 40] From this,
individual interests that are non-selfish in nature must
further prove that they are moral and rational before they
can be defined as being in the public interest. These
rules are:
1. Fundamental Moral Rules—are comprehensive,
general, not dependent upon specific contexts, and so
important that "without them no civilized society
would survive and few goods could be achieved."
Examples are the rule against breaking promises, lying,
stealing, and killing.
2. Local Rules—apply fundamental rules to
specialized contexts or regulate aspects of




3. Neutral Rules—occur where behavior must be
regularized but where there is little or nothing to
choose between various possible rules. Example is
that it would be just as well to drive on the left
if everyone else did. [Ref. 41]
The final proof that an individual interest is in the
public interest, according to Flathman, revolves around two
concepts of reason and value that determine whether a non-
selfish and morally sound individual interest is rational in
its application. Flathman lists two principles that are
applicable when testing whether non-selfish and morally
sound individual interests are in the public interest.
These principles are:
1. The Principle of Consequences (PC) — If the
consequences of A doing X would be undesirable, then A
ought not to do X. Or in its positive formulation, if
the consequences of A's not doing X would be undesirable,
then A ought to do X.
2. The Universalizability Principle (U) — If A claims
that it is right for him to do or have X, he must agree
that it is right for BCD..N to do or have X unless he
can show that he or his circumstances are different
from BCD..N or their circumstances in a manner relevant
to the justification of his being an exception. In
political terms, if government A treats BCD in fashion
X, it is obligated to treat EFG in the same way unless
it can show differences between BCD and EFG which
justify different treatment. [Ref. 42]
In summation, Flathman' s theory of public interest does
not describe all of the dimensions of political or private
behavior for the excellent reason that such is not the
purpose of any theory of public interest. It does, however,
assist in informing us about aspects of political and
private behavior by calling attention to discrepancies and/
or political tradeoffs between the norm (which most theories
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of public interest are based upon) and the actual practice
Flathman's overall theory of public interest is further
summarized and illustrated in Table 6.
TABLE 6
R. E. FLATHMAN'S THEORY OF PUBLIC INTEREST
Individual Interests/ \
Self-regarding Other-regarding




Subjectively defined Objectively defined
Selfish Non-selfish
MORAL RULES








1. Principle of Consequences (PC)





Glendon A. Schubert, in his book The Public Interest :
A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept
, is critical
of the concept of public interest, which he feels is
"nothing more than a label attached indiscriminately to a
miscellany of particular compromises of the moment." He
continues this critique by adding that "if the public
interest concept makes no operational sense, notwithstanding
the efforts of a generation of capable scholars, the
political scientists might better spend their time nurturing
concepts that offer greater promise of becoming useful
tools in the scientific study of political responsibility."
[Ref. 43] Yet within the author's overall critique of the
concept he classifies the field of writings on the public
interests into three theories. These theories are the
rational (referring to the general public) , the idealist
(referring to political parties) , and the realistic (refer-
ring to interest groups)
.
The rationalist theory of writings view the public
interest as evolving from a nation's people. The role of
government in this theory is to carry out the dictates and
submit to the will of the people. The theory assumes a
democratic type of national unity and an overall concern for
the common welfare of the nation's people. It is in direct
opposition to the realist theory as will become apparent
when it is discussed. The rationalist theory of writers on
the public interest generally feel that the most useful
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method of determining what the public wants is the concept
of majority rule-utilizing elections and the results of
public opinion polls. [Ref. 44]
The universal concepts of justice, liberty, and freedom
are the cornerstone of the idealistic theory of writings on
the public interest. In this type of theory, the public is
viewed as being inadequate in determining what is in its own
good. Idealists argue for strong government leaders who are
able to act as their conscience dictates rather than to
submit to pressure from individuals or interest groups
.
Therefore, the public servant, acting as an elite, is the
very heart of the system and articulates, as an individual,
the public interest to the people. [Ref. 45]
The realist theory assumes the public interest to con-
sist of numerous special interest groups that are in
perpetual conflict against one another. Therefore, the
realists do not view majority rule like the rationalists.
They view it as "pluralistic elements banding together in
temporary alliance to create a one-time majority." There-
fore, the public interest is the outcome of these alliances
and public officials need only to "resolve in their own
mind the variety of choices and make implications of the
decision—and make a final determination." [Ref. 46] In
summation, Schubert's principle strength appears to be his
discussion of different views of public interest theory that
all rely on a tight and highly structured political system.
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With the completion of Schubert's definition, I have
looked at two fundamentally different definitions of the
public interest. What do they mean? Which one is valid
today? Could the public interest still be undefined as
suggested by Arthur S. Miller? Miller postulates in a
legal journal "that one of the basic reasons for the oft
asserted current marasmus [wasting away] of the administra-
tive agency (and perhaps of much of public administration
generally) is the failure to develop acceptable and
workable criteria by which the public interest may be
judged and evaluated. [Ref. 47] He adds to this overall
ambiguity of the concept with statements such as: "The
public interest concept is to the bureaucracy what the due
process clause is to the judiciary." [Ref. 48] Yet other
writers, such as Peter L. Berger, suggest that the public
interest was ultimately powerful enough to change US
foreign policy as to the continued conduct of the Vietnam
Conflict. Ke has stated that the public interest, being
represented at the time by a new intellectual elite, was
probably instrumental in the US withdrawal from Vietnam and
represented "a great victory for the forces of morality in
American public life" as well as "a decisive defeat" for
espoused interest groups. [Ref. 49] Therefore, my discus-
sion on US public interest means that: "If the question of
US national interest is a dilemna, and the US public
interest is part of that same process, the question of US
public interests is also a dilemna for the same reasons."
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These reasons revolve around the subject's general ambi-
guity, the complexity of the subject when applied to a
democratic country such as the US, the fact that the US
government has not defined the concept, and the fact that
it attempts to identify and label the overall US public
value. Because of this, numerous definitions of the
concept have been postulated for general consumption and
they are normally all valid in their given context.
Consequently, I have no qualms about formulating my own
definition of the US public interest. This definition is
based on the existing literature in the field and
summarized in the following six points:
1. The public interest is a valid, although sometimes
ambiguous, concept that attempts to represent the
ultimate belief standard of the US populace.
2. The public interest and the national interest are
part of the same process in pluralistic (democratic)
societies.
3. The public interest must continually place con-
straints on public policy or the democratic process
will fail and possible lead to violent disorder.
4. The public interest as a concept must be based
upon non-selfish individual interests, justified
moral rules, and rational thought. This concept is
exacerbated by political tradeoffs, interest groups,
and philosophical theories that are non-democratic
in nature.
5. Non-governmental indicators of the public interest
are political election results, published opinion
polls, the size and frequency of civilian demonstra-
tions and/or civil disorders, and published statements
by religious and/or influencial personalities.
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6. Governmental indicators of the public interest are
foreign and domestic policy decisions, judicial
(especially Supreme Court ) rulings, the budget,
enacted legislation affecting industry, individual
income tax rates, the amount of special states
legislated to certain professions and occupations
and the writings of this country's forefathers (i.e.,
Preamble, Common Sense
, and the writings and speeches
of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams etc.) that con-
tinue to influence public/political thought.
Having discussed and defined the concept of US public
interest, it is now appropriate to take the information
gained in discussing the US public interest and put this
information to work, when applicable, in defining the
concept of US national interest. The definition of US
national interest, like the definition of US public interest,
and the prioritized listing of overall US national interests
are considerable matters of debate among scholars, students,
governmental officials, and political scientists. As stated
earlier, the concept's definition is quite simply a dilemna.
This fact is generally attributed to the complexity of the
subject, the fact that US national interests represent the
ultimate belief standard of the US populace, and, most
importantly, the fact that US national interests oversee a
vast category of desires from sovereign states that vary
enormously from state to state and from time to time. The
textbook-type definitions of national interest by
Frederick H. Hartmann and W.P. Gerberding provide a useful
service in introducing the concept, although they are
generally considered to be only the initial steppingstones
in a thorough definition of the concept. Hartmann defines
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national interest as "what states seek to protect or
achieve vis-a-vis other states . " He extends this by
stating that national interests may be further categorized
into vital and secondary interests. Vital interests are a
product of the current situation and are those interests
that a state will normally immediately fight to protect.
Such vital interests, as a minimum, include the protection
of existing territory and the preservation of a nation's
ideals from a massive "loss of face." By contrast,
secondary interests cover a wide range of goals a state
would prefer to attain but not to the extent of fighting in
order to achieve them, [Ref. 50] Gerberding states that the
definition of national interests is simply the "security and
well-being of a nation." Whatever protects or promotes these
conditions is said to be in the national interest. [Ref.
51] These simple definitions of the concept will now be
expanded upon by utilizing the writings of James N. Rosenau,
Warner R. Schilling, Martin E. Goldstein, William P. Bundy,
and Hans J. Morgenthau to illustrate some of the more
complex and current problems associated with the concept.
Upon completion of this step, the model formulated by
Donald E. Neuchterlein will be used to assist in the
formulation of the six prioritized US national interests




Rosenau feels that the concept of national interest is
primarily used by political analysts to describe, explain, or
evaluate the adequacy, or lack of adequacy, of a nation's
foreign policy. The concept is used by political actors as
a means of justifying, renouncing, or proposing foreign or
domestic policies. Because the concept of national interest
is vague, it complicates the analyst's task whereas it
increases the utility of the concept to political actors.
[Ref. 52] Therefore, according to Rosenau, it is a nebulous
concept of little real utility that political actors use to
their advantage whenever possible.
The historical usage of the term "national interest" has
been traced to both sixteenth century Italy and seventeenth
century England. However, it was not until this century that
the term came into use as an analytical tool. [Ref. 53]
Rosenau has divided analysts and political actors who use
the term as an analytical tool into two categories:
objectivists and subjectivists
.
Objectivists, such as Hans Morgenthau, concern them-
selves with evaluating the worth of a nation's foreign
policy. They state that what is best for a nation is a
matter of objective reality (realpolitik) and that by
describing this reality analysts and political actors are
able to utilize the concept of national interest as a basis
for evaluating the appropriateness of a nation's policies.
Since national interest is based on reality, objectivists
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normally do not explain how or why something is considered
to be in the national interest. Morgenthau states that the
national interest is also effected by a nation's relative
power during a particular period of history and that this
power, in relation to other nations, is an objective reality
for that nation to consider in its domestic and foreign
policy decisions. [Ref. 54]
In comparison, subjectivists are concerned more with
explaining why nations do what they do when they engage in
international affairs. They define the national interest as
not being a single truth that exists in the real world, but
as a pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change
whenever the requirements and goals of a nation's members
change. Basically, the subjectivists feel that the national
interest is based upon whatever a nation's leaders seek to
preserve and/or enhance. [Ref. 55]
Although it may be easy to criticize these two schools
of thought as being simplistic in nature, I feel that they
adequately represent two definitions of national interest
that illustrate adequately the extent of disagreement in
defining the concept. Therefore, these two schools of
thought should not be regarded as being too nebulus—but
regarded as two simple and rational viewpoints that repre-
sent the overall feelings of some social scientists and




In a 1956 article, Walter R. Schilling discusses the
concept of national interest by reviewing the books Ideals
and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations by Robert
Osgood and Power Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as
a Basis of Foreign Policy by Thomas Cook and Malcolm Moos.
Osgood, according to Schilling, analyzes US foreign
policy from 1890 to 1941 and judges it to be unsatisfactory
because Americans "were largely ignorant of the actual ends of
motives of nations, including their own." Consequently, US
national interests, defined by Osgood as "a state of affairs
valued solely for its benefit to a nation" were ignored
during this period as the US remained basically isolationist
in nature except for its brief interlude in World War I.
[Ref. 56] He lists self-preservation of the nation, self-
sufficiency, national prestige, and national aggrandizement
as the basic interests which benefit a nation and states
that for the US, the Christian, liberal, humanitarian, and
traditional Western ideals upon which it was founded compli-
cate the process of evaluating national interests when these
ideals interfere unrealis tically with real world problems.
Osgood feels that Americans, prior to World War II, over-
estimated the importance of certain ideals to the detriment
of its national interests. Because of this, US policies
were typified as being full of "drift, bewilderment,
improvisation, and disillusionment." However, World War II
did much to force Americans into realizing that US
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self-preservation is dependent, to a great degree, on
overseas power and that ideals, by themselves, will not stop
bullets. [Ref. 57]
Cook and Moos, who deal specifically with the post-World
War II Cold War and Korean Conflict period, evaluate the
effects World War II had on policy makers and state that
America, should not discard the principles of its good
society because the ramifications of doing so may be adverse
to the overall international arena. [Ref. 58] In many
respects, Cook and Moos are in direct disagreement with
Osgood over the moral conflict the concept of national
interest presents decision makers daily. US national
interest must be justified, to some degree by morality.
Because of this, problems continually surface when foreign
policy decisions do not conform to some individual's or
group's definition of morality. In many respects, this is
an everpresent problem that is at the heart of the basic
problem and creates a dilemna that the concept has not been
able to shake itself free from. Therefore, Cook and Moos'
attack on Osgood's realistic position is entirely under-
standable and legitimate in their eyes as : "Universally
applicable moral principles are vital to the generation of
national power and influence." [Ref. 59] Although Schilling
felt that this idealist-realist conflict was fading in the
mid-1950s, he was obviously mistaken as the 1980
Presidential election victory of the realist Ronald Reagan
over the idealist Jimmy Carter has clearly proven.
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Martin E. Goldstein, another realist, must certainly
feel that the primary objectives of US foreign policy is
national security. Consequently, criteria must be esta-
blished as to which portions of the globe must be defended
in a conventional military manner. For the US, according to
Goldstein, the portion of the globe that is critical to US
conventional mode security includes Canada, Mexico, and the
Caribbean area. [Ref. 60] To assist decision makers in
deciding which areas of the globe must be kept out of enemy
hands due to national interests, he has established nine
fundamental and logical indicators. These are:




Strategic location including control over external
land, waterways, and geographic configurations;
3. Sources of scarce and vital resources;
4. External economic markets;
5. Supplies of scarce and vital finished goods;
6. Repositories of the countries private investment;
7. Friendly countries with influence potential based
on population;
8. Friendly countries with a highly industrialized
level of economy;
9. Friendly countries with military power. [Ref. 61]
William P. Bundy suggests additional objectives of US
foreign policy, in addition to the primary objectives of
national security, that revolve around the maintenance of an
international community and the encouragement of
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representative (democratic) governments. [Ref. 62] He
feels that idealism has a valid place in pragmatic US
foreign policy and that this often creates a problem that
affects foreign policy decisions and/or decisions that
affect the national interest. He states: Conservatives and
liberals alike have been readily subject to delusions about
particular regimes abroad. We have a strong tendency to set
up our own white and black hats... we are often harder on
authoritarian regimes where there is still a measure of
freedom, but its sins are visible, than we are on regimes
which extinguished freedom totally long ago and so have no
visible sins." [Ref. 63] In simple terms, it is probably
inappropriate to support any political leader or system on
purely ideological grounds. Stressing idealism, Bundy '
s
five recommendations follow:
1. In assessing undemocratic regimes, let us judge
those of the Right and those of the Left on the same
scales, and let us recognize that there are important
differences of degree;
2. Our power to influence resides overwhelmingly in
our example
;
3. The US should remain strongly committed, loyal
and supportive of "core area" allies i.e., Western
Europe and Japan. The defense of Japan and the
avoidance of serious great-power conflict in Northeast
Asia, still require in my judgement our strong support
of Korea despite the deplorable excesses of its
leadership;
4. If one accepts the new degree of American involve-
ment in the Middle East as inevitable—both for the
sake of Israel and for the sake of our oil supply—one
must accept the ambiguities that go with it.
46

5. Our concern for democracy, and our distaste for
dictatorship, should have much clearer weight in our
total policies than they have had for some years past;
among other things it matters that we say frequently
what we stand for. More of our policy, and much more
of our public posture toward other nations, can tilt
in the direction of democracy and against dictatorship
of any stripe. [Ref. 64]
There is, perhaps, a nearly perfect example of how US
foreign policy objectives interact with the national
interest and idealism to create a dilemna that, in many
ways, typifies decision makers problems in this area:
Overriding the objections of some scientists, the
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt made the
decision not to share atomic secrets with the USSR.
Henry Stimson considered promising such secrets in
return for an opening of Soviet society, and had FDR
lived he might quite possibly have used "atomic
diplomacy" to ease America's postwar role. President
Truman later saw the US as a trustee of the awesome
weapon. Although at times he seemed disposed to listen
to Stimson and Acheson who suggested a more open and
direct approach to the Soviet Union, he was averse to
sharing secrets that might end America's nuclear
monopoly. [Ref. 65]
Although Kans J. Morgenthau ' s definition of national
interest, which is based on national power, has been
discussed previously, his views on morality within the
concept have not been discussed. Morgenthau describes his
views by addressing two opposing schools of thought. He
labels these as the Utopian and realist view. The Utopians
believe "in a rational and moral political order based on
the essential goodness of human nature" whereas the realists
(which includes Morgenthau) address the world as "consisting
of opposing interests generating conflict and where moral
principles can at best be approximated." [Ref. 66] He
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states in exacting terms the large degree of disagreement
between the two schools of thought. For example, the
Utopian view charges the realist view as being "contemptuous
of the simple benefits of honest men, [it] jeers at the
sentimentalism of those who believe that man may strive for
peace among nations." In comparison, the realist view
charges the Utopian view as not being scientific because of
their dismissal of certain concepts the realists view as
being extremely relevant, such as the principle of "balance
of power." Morgenthau states: "Nothing more needs to be
said to demonstrate that facts do not support a revision of
American diplomatic history which tries to substitute
humanitarian and pacifist traditions for power politics and
the balance of power as the guiding principles of American
foreign policy." [Ref. 67]
Because of his realist leanings, Morgenthau lists only
two basic elements required to be addressed by policy makers
in their formulation of foreign policy. These are:
1. National survival is the most basic, necessary
element and when two or more nations have common survival
interests bipartisanship in their foreign policies is
easily achieved;
2. Variable elements complicate the alignment of
interests as personalities, public opinion, sectional
interests, partisan politics, and political and moral
tradition are brought to bear upon their determination.
[Ref. 68]
If foreign policy decisions are addressed within the
above two elements, the legitimacy and compatibility of
these decisions with national values (i.e., public interest)
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and the national interests of other nations can be addressed
in terms of subnational, other national, and supra-national
group interests, as well as scientific analysis and the
interests of other nations. He feels that scientific
analysis is useful in weeding out national objectives that
are unattainable in terms of available resources and that the
interests of other nations, in a multinational world, are
critical in an age of potential total war. [Ref. 69] This
latter idea proposes that there is a natural international
aspect within the concept of national interests that must
take place before specific policies can be addressed. These
specific policies, even for a realist such as Morgenthau,
certainly include morality and he lists five points in
regards to moral implications that he feels national actors
must follow. These are:
1. To know that states are subject to moral law is one
thing; to pretend to know what is morally required of
states in a particular situation is another;
2. Care must be taken in either overrating the influence
of this on ethics on international politics or of
denying that statesmen and diplomats are moved by any-
thing but considerations of power;
3. Moral principles cannot be applied to the actions
of states without considering the situation in which
they are taken;
4. The realist recognizes that a moral decision,
especially in the political sphere, does not imply a
simple choice between a moral principle and an action
which is morally irrelevant or immoral;
5. The political realist distinguishes between his




Having reviewed the concept of national interest as
described by the likes of Rosenau, Schilling, Goldstein,
Bundy, and Morgenthau
, it is now time to summarize their
thoughts and move to the more immediate goals of my efforts,
which is to define the six most important US national
interests. To assist me in this more immediate effort, I
have decided to utilize, to a great degree, the model
proposed by Donald E. Neuchterlein, in his 1978 book
entitled National Interests and Presidential Leadership :
The Setting of Priorities
, because it is relatively new and
it is one that I feel comfortable in using. However, before
the Nuechterlein model is utilized, the previous discussion
of the concept by the aforementioned six authorities is
summarized by the following seven points:
1. Although the concept of national interest appears
quite vague, it has political use in justifying,
renouncing, or proposing foreign and/or domestic policies.
In this light, the public interest is a factor in
determining the national interest;
2. There are numerous definitions of the concept and
these definitions tend to fall into two distinct
categories: Realists who feel the national interest
relies on realpolitik and the ability of a nation to
meaningfully interject its military power, if required.
Idealists who feel that a rational and moral political
order based on the essential goodness of human nature
is a possibility that can be achieved;
3. All definitions of national interest are justified,
to some degree, by morality;
4. Various methods of assisting decision makers in
establishing the national interest have been formulated.
These methods revolve around geo-strategic considerations,
resource acquisition, maintenance of the international
system, encouragement of democratic processes,
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ideological issues, and the ability to extend national
power militarily, if necessary;
5. The question of national interest is ultimately
based upon its most basic goal of national survival.
All other goals are secondary and normally temporary
in their international application;
6. If foreign policy decisions are addressed within
the concept of national interest, the legitimacy and
compatibility of these decisions with national values
(i.e., the public interest) is open to question by
various political and non-political interest groups,
and/or influencial individuals;
7. The concept of US survival and vital interests
loses some of its international validity because many
identified national interests appear to be non-
defensible militarily.
Donald E. Neuchterlein offers a new approach to defining
the national interest based on his study of presidential
decisions on US involvement in foreign wars. The basis of
his definition stems from his belief that there are four
basic US national interests: protection of American lives
(defense) ; protection of US shipping (economic) ; protection
of humanity and civilization (world order) ; and protection of
fundamental human rights (ideological) . [Ref . 71] His belief
in these four basic US national interests is to a great
degree, based upon the public speeches of Woodrow Wilson and
Franklin D. Roosevelt immediately prior to US involvement in
World Wars I and II respectively. Wilson's message on April
2, 1917 is an excellent example of how these four basic
national interests were addressed immediately prior to US
involvement in World War I. Wilson's statements about these
basic national interests were as follows:
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Defense interest : "There is one choice we cannot make,
we are incapable of making: we will not choose the
path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of
our nation and our people to be ignored or violated.
The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no
common wrongs: they cut to the very roots of human life.'
Economic interest : "I am not thinking of the loss of
property involved, immense and serious as that is...
Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and
innocent people cannot be."
World order interest : "Our object now, as then, is to
vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life
of the world, as against selfish and autocratic power,
and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed
peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of
action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those
principles .
"
Ideological interest : "We are glad, now that we see the
facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight
thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the
liberation of its people, the German peoples included:
for the rights of nations great and small and the
privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life
and of obedience. The world must be made safe for
democracy. Its peace must be placed upon the tested
foundations of political liberty." [Ref. 72]
Roosevelt 's arguments, during a radio address to the
nation on December 29, 1940, address the same basic points
less than a year before US involvement in World War II.
They are summarized, in the same format as Wilson's below:
Defense interest : "Germany has said that she was
occupying Belgium to save the Belgians from the British.
Would she then hesitate to say to any South American
country, 'We are occupying you to protect you from
aggression by the United States?' Belgium today is
being used as an invasion base against Britain, now
fighting for its life. Any South American country,
in Nazi hands, would always constitute a jumping-off
place for German attack on any one of the other
Republics of this hemisphere."
Economic interest : "If Great Britain goes down, the
Axis powers. . .will be in a position to bring enormous
military and naval resources against this hemisphere.
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It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all
the Americas would be living at the point of a gun--
a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well
as military.
"
World order interest ; "The Nazi masters of Germany
have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate
all life and thought in their own country, but also to
enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the
resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world. .
.
In other words, the Axis not merely admits but proclaims
that there can be no ultimate peace between their
philosophy of government and our philosophy of
government .
"
Ideological interest : "The history of recent years
proves that shootings and chains and concentration camps
are not simply the transient tools but the very altars
of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a 'new order'
in the world, but what they have in mind is only a
revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that
there is no liberty, no religion, no hope. The
proposed 'new order' is the very opposite of a United
States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not
a government based upon self-respecting men and women
to protect themselves and their freedom and their
dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of
power and self to dominate and enslave the human race."
[Ref. 73]
The four basic US national interests described earlier
in the speeches of Woodrow Wilson and FDR are beneficial in
creating a simple definition of US national interest.
However, they need to be expanded upon if they are to assist
in providing decision makers with any guidelines to help
identify such US national interests. In expanded form,
Nuechterlein offers these definitions:
Defense interests : the protection of the nation-state
and its citizens against the threat of physical violence
directed from another state or against an externally
inspired threat to its system of government. Defense
interests entail only the protection of the homeland,
the citizens, and the political system of the nation-
state; they do not include alliances with other states,
although they may include strategic bases whose primary
function is the protection of the homeland.
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Economic interests : the enhancement of the nation-
state's economic well-being in relations with other
states
.
World order interests : the maintenance of an inter-
national political and economic system in which the
nation-state may feel secure and in which its
citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside
its borders.
Ideological interests : the protection and furtherance
of a set of values that the citizens of a nation-state
share and believe to be universally good. A nation's
ideology is an important part of its national interest
—
although it may not be adhered to as strongly as the
other three, it is nevertheless important in determining
how a nation reacts to international issues. [Ref. 74]
Therefore, the four basic national interests outlined
above should be considered as dynamic factors that
condition the behavior of nation states. Consequently,
changes in their overall priority are usually measured in
years, rather than in months. Realizing that this is the
basic framework for Neuchterlein 's definition, it is now
possible to more fully understand what is meant when he
states: "The national interest is the perceived needs and
desires (based on the four basic national interests) of one
sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states com-
prising its external environment." [Ref. 75] Before
discussing the additional factor of intensities and interest,
it must be stated that I agree with all but one aspect of
his definition. Simply put, this aspect is my belief that
the public interest and the national interest are part of
the same process in democratic countries. In contrast,
Neuchterlein states: "This [my] definition also draws a
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distinction between the external and the international
environments of states; the way in which a government deals
with the internal environment of the state is usually
referred to as the public interest, but the way it deals
with the external environment is the national interest.
"
[Ref. 76]
The identification of the basic national interest, or
interests, is but\±he first step decision makers must make in
the establishment of overall foreign policy. The second and
final step is to assess the intensity of that interest which
the decision makers of a country believe is involved. In
order to analyze the differing degrees of intensity,
Nuechterlein has developed four categories of differing
intensities to assist a government in establishing what it
should do and what policies it should adopt. These
categories follow:
1. Survival issues : when the very existence of a
nation-state is in jeopardy, as a result of overt
military attack on its own territory, or from the
threat of attack if an enemy's demands are rejected.
3. Vital issues : when serious harm will very likely
result to the state unless strong measures, including
the use of conventional military forces, are employed
to counter an adverse action by another state or to
deter it from undertaking a serious provocation.
3. Major issues : when a state's political, economic,
and ideological well-being may be adversely affected
by events and trends in the international environment
and thus requires corrective action in order to prevent
them from becoming serious threats (vital issues)
.
4. Peripheral issues : when a state's well-being is not
adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but when
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the interests of private citizens and companies
operating in other nations might be endangered.
[Ref. 77]
Based primarily on the Nuechterlein model but taking
into account all of the preceding information, a variety of
US national interests might be listed and assigned priorities
It is obvious to this writer that any such list would
certainly include within it: the preservation of the nation;
the belief in peaceful change; the rule of law; the principle
of majority rule; the effort to assist in the development of
weaker nations; and the belief in the freedom and rights of
the individual man. In this light, I define the six most
important survival and vital US national interests in 19 81
as being:
1. the permanent maintenance of US national survival;
2. the permanent maintenance of US domestic order;
3. the temporary maintenance of friendly political,
economic, and military ties with West European countries,
individually and collectively, with particular emphasis
on the NATO alliance;
4. the temporary maintenance of the present Middle East
balance of power with particular emphasis on Persian
Gulf oil routes and supplies;
5. the temporary maintenance of the continued flow of
raw materials, oil, and goods from Africa and South
America;
6. the temporary maintenance of Egypt, Israel, Japan,
Mexico, South Korea, and Spain's existence and security.
The US national interests defined above are also
prioritized as they were listed based upon Neuchterlein 's
national interest matrix [Ref. 78] and my own subjective
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evaluation of each identified national interest. Table 7
illustrates numerically, by showing where the identified and
prioritized interests fall into Nuechterlein ' s matrix, how
the six identified US survival and vital national interests
are categorized in my thoughts:
TABLE 7
CLASSIFICATION OF THE SIX IDENTIFIED AND
PRIORITIZED 1981 US NATIONAL INTERESTS
Basic interest at stake Intensity of interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland 1
Economic well-being 3*, 4*,
5
Favorable world 3*, 4*,
order
Ideological 2
Note (*) -Vital interests 3 and 4 are considered to be a
factor of equal importance in both of the identified basic
interests
.
It must be strongly stressed that the above list of US
national interests is worthless unless it is backed by a
favorable US national will. As previously discussed,
national interests in democratic countries rely on elements
of national power, and national power relys on the domestic
sector. Therefore, in real terms, it is impossible to
separate public from national interests. This is particular-
ly true in the US where national interests must satisfy
internal legitimacy (i.e., US Congressional power of the
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purse) and the external demands dictated by the current
overall situation. [Ref. 79] For the purpose of this thesis,
however, I have only concerned myself with what I consider
to be associated with the most fundamental survival
national interest of the US—that of the permanent mainte-
nance of US national survival. The six US national interests
that I have previously identified readily fall into, or
could affect this most fundamental interest. I consider all
other US national interests to be built around these six
identified interests.
Translated into military terms, this most fundamental
national interest requires the US, with its military forces,
if necessary, to prevent or thwart any hostile attack on the
American states or on the basic elements of its economic and
security systems. While these latter systems are subject to
change over a period of time, the defense of Western Europe,
the ability to counter conventional Soviet expansionism or
aggression, the ability to counter strategic Soviet forces,
the free access to goods and markets, the maintenance of
other allies existence and freedom, the ability to meaning-
fully influence the world balance of power, and the mainte-
nance of US domestic order are all easily classified as
survival or vital interests of the US.
In the 1980s, only the Soviet Union will have the
capability of launching an all-out attack on the US homeland.
The problem in dealing with Soviet power today and in the
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next decade is twofold. First, it calls for continuation
of the maintenance of American strategic nuclear parity with
the Soviets. Secondly, and more importantly from my view-
point, it also requires that the US, in conjunction with its
European allies, has the ability to counter any conventional
Soviet aggression that threatens the world balance of power.
Strategy for the nation's long-term defense focuses attention
on the peacful evolution of the two superpower worlds into a
true multipolar world (i.e., the US, USSR, European
Community, Japan, and China) and a greater interdependency
of national economies. In this situation, the US will best
assure its security by maintaining a nuclear parity with the
Soviet Union, and in concurrence with its Western allies, by
evincing a credible conventional military force. Therefore,
a foreign policy emphasizing the dynamics of the NATO
Alliance to preserve the balance of power in Europe must be
continued in the 1980s. It is definitely a vital US national
interest. However, the nature and extent of US participation
in NATO is subject to debate, dependent on other requirements
to insure the achievement of our other survival and vital
national interests. Looked at in this manner, the concept
of national interest may be used as a tactic to assist in the
redefining of current domestic and foreign policies.
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III. WARSAW PACT ASSESSMENT
This chapter will assess the current advantages of the
Warsaw Pact, stressing the Soviet dominance of Warsaw Pact
troops over NATO troops in selected categories that would
have an influence on today's European battlefield. It will
also incorporate current regional issues, political and
military, that could affect the outcome of any future
conflict (s)
.
The following excerpt sets the tone desired for the
Warsaw Pact of the 1980s and although it is fictional, its
facts and figures are extraordinarily accurate today:
Of immediate concern to NATO were the thirty-two Soviet
divisions—sixteen tank, fifteen motorized, with at
least one (and perhaps more) airborne, all in Category
I—stationed in European countries of the Warsaw Pact.
These formed four groups of forces—army commands, in
effect—one each in the German Democratic Republic
(Group of Soviet Forces in Germany) , Poland (the Northern
Group) , Czechoslovakia (the Central Group) and Hungary
(the Southern Group) , containing in total over half a
million men and 11,000 tanks, with some 8,000 artillery
pieces and over 1,000 integral aircraft. The Sixteenth
Air Army, also deployed in the GDR, represents no more
than the spearhead of the available tactical air
resources. In the western USSR are seventy more
divisions (a third of them tank) , of which only a few
are kept in Category I, but from which further
reinforcements are readily available. In addition to the
Soviet forces in Central Europe, the Warsaw Pact countries
of the Northern Tier (the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland)
can deploy a dozen tank and a score of motorized
divisions of their own, all organized, armed and trained
on the Soviet model, while in the Southern Tier (Hungary,
Bulgaria and Rumania) the one tank and five motorized




The "Agreement on Friendship, Coordination, and Mutual
Assistance" was concluded in Warsaw on 14 May 1955. The
designation "Warsaw Pact" was given to the organization at
a subsequent meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union,
Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Rumania, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia. The formation of the Pact was com-
pleted in 1957 with the conclusion of bi-lateral agreements
between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Poland, Rumania,
and Hungary concerning the stationing of Soviet troops in
those countries. A similar agreement was reached with
Czechoslovakia on 16 October 1968, after the intervention
and occupation by Soviet forces. The formal justification
for concluding the treaties was the rearming and admission
of the FRG into the NATO Alliance on May 5, 1955. [Ref. 81]
On September 13, 1968, Albania formally withdrew from the
Warsaw Pact, contending that the Soviet intervention in
Czechoslovakia was a breach of the conditions as to Warsaw
Pact membership. [Ref. 82] During a recent election speech,
Andrei Gromyko commented on the current Warsaw Pact role by
stating: "The Organization of the Warsaw Treaty reliably
protects the security of its members and there is no doubt
that the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty, due in May
[1980] , will become a demonstration of cohesion of fraternal
countries and of their resolve to firmly pursue the policy




Although the combined NATO countries' GNP is over
twice that of the combined Warsaw Pact countries' ($3.7
and 1.6 Trillion respectively) and total NATO countries'
population is almost 200 million people more than the
Warsaw Pact member countries' (564 and 371 million respec-
tively), the Warsaw Pact's total military manpower is
approximately 3 50,000 men higher than that of the NATO
Alliance's [Ref. 84] Tables 8, 9, and 10 simplify and
numerically illustrate the current Warsaw Pact advantages
in ground forces, tactical air forces, and main battle
tanks. From these tables, one can readily quantify Warsaw
Pact advantages in these critical areas as they relate to
the two opposing military alliances.
TABLE 8
Ground Forces Available Without Mobilization" (div equivalents)6





Warsaw (of which Warsaw (of which
Nato Pact USSR) Nato Pact USSR>
13 5} 6 2
13 37$ 15 2
T
26 44 21 4
" Includes: nato ready forces, Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, and non-Soviet Pact divisions in Category 1 (see
note on p. 1 5).
* Divisions, brigades and similar formations aggregated on the basis of three brigades to a division.
c Nato figures are for afcent and afnorth combined. Since neither of the commanders of these forces can be assured
of the support of ground forces in Portugal or Britain, these are not included. By the same criterion. French forces
are also not included, although three divisions are currently deployed in Germany. Forces in Berlin are also excluded.
Warsaw Pact forces include all Category 1 divisions of East Germany (2 tk, 4 mech), Czechoslovakia (3 tk, 3 mech)
and Poland (5 tk, 3 mech), and Soviet divisions deployed in those countries in peacetime.
* Nato forces include Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces and, on the Warsaw Pact side, the Category 1 land
forces of Bulgaria (1 tk, 5 mech), Hungary (1 tk, 3 mech), and Romania (2 tk, 5 mech), together with 4 Category 1
Soviet divisions (2 :k, 2 mech) stationed in Hungary.
Source: The Military Balance 1980-1981 (London:





































•The area covered here is slightly wider than the one described in note c to Table I. Many aircraft have a long
range capability and in any case can be redeployed very quickly. Accordingly, the figures here include the appropriate
British and American aircraft in Britain, American aircraft in Spain and Soviet aircraft in the western USSR. They
do not, however, include the American dual-based squadrons, which would add about 100 fighter-t\pe aircraft to the
nato totals, nor French squadrons with perhaps another 400 fighters. C'arrier-borne aircraft of the US Navy arc
excluded, but so are the medium bombers in the Soviet Air Force, which could operate in a tactical role, and also
several hundred heavily armed helicopters which pose a considerable threat to ground forces Overcrowding of
forward airfields could prove a limiting factor in the amount of air power nato can deploy
Source: The Military Balance 1980-1981, p. 113.
TABLE 10
Main Battle Tank Comparison










Main battle tanks in
operational service" 7,000 19,500 12,500 4,000 6,700 2,500
" These are tanks with formations or earmarked for the use of dual-based or immediate reinforcing formations (some
600). They do not include those in reserve or small stocks held to replace tanks damaged or destroyed. In this latter
category nato has perhaps 2,500 tanks in Central Europe. There are tanks in reserve in the Warsaw Pact area, but
the figures are difficult to establish. The total Pact tank holdings are, however, materially higher than the formation
totals shown in the table and are presumed to be held in stockpiles or in independent units.
Source: The Military Balance 1980-1981, p. 112.
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Besides having a numerical advantage in personnel and
major items of combat equipment, the Warsaw Pact may also
be benefiting from today's world scene. The Soviet Union
is currently occupying its southern neighbor Afghanistan
in what is seen by many as the initial step to gain
control of Middle East oil and lands. In Europe, NATO
appears years away from countering the ominous Soviet
buildup of medium and long-range missiles as well as
conventional forces. [Ref. 85] President Carter's 1980
State of the Union Address proposed to use military force
to repulse any Soviet attempt to seize control of Persian
Gulf oil, negotiate for use of naval and air facilities near
the Persian Gulf, expand permanent US military presence,
particularly naval, in the Indian Ocean and supply a
trillion dollars over five years to beef up US defenses.
[Ref. 86] These events, combined with the Reagan
Administration's redefining of US foreign policy (discussed
in Chapter II) and even further increased defense budgets,
clearly indicate that the US ' s foreign policy priorities,
at least temporarily, may have shifted away from NATO. US
Army Chief of Staff, General E. C. Meyer, in his 1980 white
paper addresses this by stating: "The most demanding
challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the
1980s is to develop and demonstrate the capability to
successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of
Europe." [Ref. 87] During a recent speech at the US Naval
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Postgraduate School, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Thomas 3. Hayward, commented on the same general theme. The
admiral stated that "If we are the leader of the free world,
we have global responsibilities, and we have to face up to
them. " He continued by stating events in Iran and
Afghanistan have shifted American policy away from a "NATO
First" priority. [Ref. 88]
The Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union in particular, can
also much more readily accept an overall change of mission
when compared numerically with NATO and/or US military
forces. This is because the Soviet Union has a total of
167 active army divisions. Although these divisions are not
all at the one hundred percent level in terms of personnel
and equipment, they represent a substantial force for
enforcing overall Soviet foreign policy goals militarily,
if necessary. Only 30 of the 167 Soviet divisions are
directly assigned to the Warsaw Pact. [Ref. 89] These
Soviet divisions, combined with the other 56 Warsaw Pact
divisions, all of which are deployed in Eastern Europe, make
it apparent that the Soviet Union can readily accept
multiple missions utilizing assets from Warsaw Pact or non-
Warsaw Pact units without greatly decreasing its Warsaw
Pact commitment. [Ref. 90] The deployment of approximately
100,000 troops into Afghanistan beginning in December 1979
is an excellent current example of this capability. Could
the US deploy 100,000 troops into Mexico and still support
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NATO as it has in the past considering that the US has a
total of only 19 active duty array and marine corps divi-
sions? As discussed in the remainder of this paragraph,
this would be difficult. NATO's major commands, Allied
Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and Allied Forces Northern
Europe (AFNORTH) , consist of 27 divisions, committed by
Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United States. [Ref. 91] Four of the
16 active duty US Army divisions are physically deployed
with AFCENT and the majority of the CONUS based US Army
divisions are "earmarked" under classified contingencies to
Europe. It is therefore obvious that any broadening of
present US military non-NATO roles would adversely affect
the present US role in NATO. Unfortunately, it appears
that the current world situation may lead the US in that
direction. Tables 11 and 12 illustrate the current re-
inforcing capabilities of Western and Eastern military
forces.
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, General Bernard W.
Rogers, recently related a US problem that compounds the
NATO reinforcement problem further. Rogers told the US
Senate Armed Services Committee that the US Individual
Ready Reserve, the pool of trained reservists who would be
NATO replacements, is at least 250,000 troops short of what
he would need for a war in Europe. He said that the US








Armd Mech Marines Armd Mech Marines Other
US" 21 •n 2i 5 3 3 H 8*
Belgium — — — — — i — 4
Britain — — — 1* — — —
Canada — — — 5 — — —
France 5 — 1 6 — — — —
W. Germany — — — — — — — 2
Netherlands — — — — i i — i
Norway — — — — — — — 3t
7i 4* H 13 H 4 5 m
Grand Total: 52*
Including light divisions (infantry and airborne) and armoured cavalry regiments.
" Some countries, particularly Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and France have plans to mobilize battalion-sized
units in some numbers in addition to the formations shown here. France also has formations earmarked for territonal
defence.




Warsaw Pact Reinforcing Formations Available (div equivalents")
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Mech/ Mech/ Mech/
Armd inf/other AB Armd inf/other AB Armd inf/other AB
USSR- 1 1 8 5 10 19 48 —
Bulgaria — — — — 2 1 * 1 —
Czechoslovakia — — — — — i 2 2 —
Hungary — — — — 1 — — 1 —
Poland — — — — 3 1 — 3 —
Romania — — — — 2 i — 2 —
18 21* 57
Grand Total: 113$
•Based in Western and Central Military Districts (excluding Leningrad, 2 divs in Transcaucasus md). Forces in
Afghanistan are believed to have come from divisions east of the Caspian, although the possibility that one or more
of the reported 5 motor rifle divisions and one airborne division may have been deployed from Western Military
Districts cannot be ignored.
Source: The Military Balance 1980-1981, p. Ill
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very high sense of confidence that I can accomplish my
mission—as far as US forces go." [Ref. 92]
One of the Warsaw Pact's most important current goals
is to obtain a more flexible response. V7ithin the past few
years, the Soviet Union has dramatically improved its
theater nuclear capabilities, which is a key element in its
flexible response. For example, one of the new Soviet
missiles, which can reach all countries around the USSR but
under the exclusive rules adopted by the US and the USSR in
SALT cannot be termed "strategic," is currently pre-
occupying NATO military staffs. It is the SS-20 missile.
This missile has a range of approximately 5000 kilometers
and is capable of carrying three independently targetable
(MIRV) nuclear warheads. The launch system uses solid fuel
and, unlike the other silo-based Soviet intercontinental
missiles, is mobile. According to US sources, the Soviets
have already deployed approximately 2 00 of these systems in
Western Russia and are adding a new one every week. [Ref. 93]
By 1985, it is estimated that between 400 and 600 of these
systems will be operational and capable of striking at
Western Europe, the Mediterranean region, and the Middle
East from either Eastern Europe or Russian soil. [Ref. 94]
Therefore, this new missile gives the Warsaw Pact/Soviet
Union an unmatched capability of striking deep into NATO's
heartland with highly accurate theater nuclear weapons that
are survivable, because of their location, against NATO's
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current theater nuclear weapons. Tables 13 and 14 depict
the current Soviet advantage in long and medium-range
nuclear systems within the European theater.
Perhaps the most glaring tactical discrepancy between
the Warsaw Pact and NATO is in the chemical warfare arena.
Although Soviet political leaders are continuing arms
limitation talks on the prohibition of chemical warfare
development, there is no evidence of Soviet restraint in
efforts to maintain superiority in combat operations
involving the use of chemical weapons. Warsaw Pact forces
regularly train with great realism in toxic environments.
A large, well-equipped and well-trained chemical, bio-
logical, and radiological organization is organic to the
Warsaw Pact service support infrastructure. The Soviets
continue to incorporate nuclear, biological, and chemical
filtration systems in various combat and combat support
equipment. A variety of modern agents, delivery systems,
and tactical doctrines necessary for large-scale use have
been developed. Whether the Warsaw Pact, more specifically
the Soviets, would initiate chemical warfare in a nuclear
or non-nuclear war is not certain. However, their capa-
bility to do so is undeniable as they are the world's most
fully trained and equipped chemical warfare force. [Ref. 95]
The lack of NATO standardization, although efforts are
being made within NATO to help diminish the effects of the
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cost, military effectiveness, and political conflict. This
creates an advantage for the Warsaw Pact because virtually
all Warsaw Pact equipment is obtained from the Soviet
Union's military industrial complex. Standardization is
best understood as the effort to adopt common doctrine,
prcedures, and equipment within NATO whenever major
economic, military, or political benefits can be gained.
[Ref. 96] The lack of standardization introduces so many
complexities into military logistics, operations, and
training that the domino-like chain reaction of inefficien-
cy is hard to measure. The US Senate Committee on Armed
Services has estimated that NATO loses 30 to 40 percent of
its combat effectiveness because of inadequate standardiza-
tion. [Ref. 97] A former Supreme Allied Commander Europe,
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, has stated that increased
standardization could have improved the military
effectiveness of his ground units by 30 to 50 percent and
of some of his tactical air units by 300 percent. [Ref. 98]
Since the Warsaw Pact has achieved nuclear parity with NATO,
the problem of standardization of conventional NATO forces
has become even more important. In addition to this, NATO
is doing less than anticipated in the area of standardiza-
tion. Because of massive costs and a feeling of US self-
interest by some of the European NATO Alliance members, NATO
leadership has seemingly placed interoperability
(interoperability is defined as making dissimilar arms and
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equipment work together by means of adaptive devices or
special training) ahead of standardization. This is the
critical feature of the problem today. NATO leadership
would like to standardize, but cannot because of member
nations' desires to act as independent entities, and is
hoping that interoperability will help to eliminate some of
the basic problems.
The VJarsaw Pact governments (the Soviet Union in
particular) have a distinct advantage over the US and other
NATO countries in their ability to pay a smaller amount of
their total defense budgets for military manpower. During
the past decade, Soviet tank forces, artillery forces, and
fixed-wing tactical air forces have been enlarged by 35,
40, and 20 percent respectively. [Ref.**99] To a great
degree, this has been possible because of Warsaw Pact
ability to conscript youth at virtually no cost. Soviet
spending for military manpower accounts for less than 30
percent of total defense spending whereas US defense
spending for manpower last year accounted for over 5 3 per-
cent of its total military budget. [Ref. 100] In the Soviet
Union, for example, every Soviet male must register with his
local draftboard at age seventeen. The following year,
under the auspices of the Universal Military Service Law of
1967, he is obligated to appear at an induction center. If
he is accepted for military service as a Soviet draftee, he




Those who fail to comply with the 1967 law are subject to
arrest and face a possible prison sentence of ten years.
[Ref. 101]
The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact neighbors also
possess an advantage over the US and its NATO allies in the
area of weapons production. The following comparison (See
Table 15) was declassified by US defense officials in 1977
and depicts the current Warsaw Pact advantage in six of the
eight weapons categories which Western intelligence experts
regularly monitor on a continual basis. Since then, addi-
tional intelligence estimates show that the USSR is now out-
producing the US in helicopters. Table 15 depiction of the
US and NATO having an approximate 30 percent advantage in

































Source: "Armed Forces Journal," (June 1977), p. 20
74

One of the most recently publicized problems that NATO,
the Reagan Administration, and Western politicians are now
discussing is the status of European NATO countries' over-
all political will to defend Western Europe. Although this
subject has been briefly addressed in Chapter I and is not
necessarily a distinct advantage for the Warsaw Pact,
considering their current and past problems in this same
general area, it does warrant further discussion. The
Reagan Administration has now inherited the touchy problem
about whether the European NATO countries are doing enough
for Western defense (for a further discussion on the




103] Today, this stems from developments in Afghanistan
and Iran which opened a political gap between the US and
its NATO Allies and the token support that the US was
given by its allies concerning economic sanctions against
Iran and the Soviet Union. These responses, coupled with
an equally token European response concerning the US
boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, have
offended American public opinion. [Ref. 104] Because of
this, published reports stating that the Europeans were
not going to meet their promised three percent increases
in defense budgets have become headline news in the US
[Ref. 105] The West Europeans have responded to this by
insisting that President Reagan can squeeze social
programs to assist the US defense budget because of the
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size of his November 1980 election victory. However, the
current West European politicians have no mandate from
their voters to do the same and therefore must show
restraint when dealing with Washington on controversial
matters. [Ref. 106] Former US Army Chief of Staff
Maxwell D. Taylor recently stated: "In NATO, the immedi-
ate question is how to offset the increase in strength of
the Warsaw Pact and, in so doing, how to obtain a larger
military contribution from our allies. Our military
chiefs need to know to what extent, if any, they should
plan to modernize NATO weaponry despite allied coolness to
the idea and whether to consider a further increase in our
own forces currently deployed there." [Ref. 107] The
current high level surfacing of this problem does not mean
that it is a new one. There has been, since 1970, an
entire generation of West Europeans who have not been
exposed to or accepted the responsibilities associated
with an independent security policy. In 1974, William
Pfaff made a statement that typifies the thoughts of many
influencial Americans today by stating: "Europeans do not
quite believe that the Soviet Union poses a very serious
threat to them; since the Americans are still in Europe
they can also excuse themselves from worrying over the
consequences of being wrong." [Ref. 108]
The final Warsaw Pact advantage this chapter will
assess pertains to the possible impact upon NATO of the
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current Eurocommunist movement. Eurocommunism, which has
gained great momentum in the past five years, is defined
by Jiri Valenta as being "a trend or process leading to an
independent, pluralistic concept of socialism, embracing
respect for individual liberties and developed primarily
within the unified framework of the democratic countries of
Western Europe." [Ref. 109] This trend is currently
impacting on three Western European nations (France,
Italy, and Spain) that have, or are attempting to establish,
links with NATO.
The French, who since 1966 have had a special relation-
ship with NATO, possess major military forces and add a
factor of uncertainty to Warsaw Pact planners. Although
they have left the NATO command structure, some of their
overall European military plans are coordinated with NATO;
those involving French nuclear weapons are autonomous. The
French Communist Party (PCF) currently attracts approxi-
mately 16 percent of the French populace's vote (16 per-
cent figure obtained from April 26, 1981 French
presidential election) . Currently, the PCF accepts NATO
as part of the existing equilibrium in Europe and advo-
cates the simultaneous dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact
and NATO. Their current stance is to attempt to weaken
the US role in NATO by emphasizing their country's "tous
azimuts" defense strategy and continued refusal to
integrate into the NATO command channels. [Ref. 110]
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Italy, a member of NATO, provides forces that are
helpful to the defense of Italy and air, ground, and sea
bases for 12,000 American soldiers (to include home ports
for the US Sixth Fleet) . In addition, the peninsular
country possesses a uniquely useful geographical position.
The Italian Communist Party (PCI) currently attracts
approximately 30 percent of the Italian populace's total
vote. The PCI gives qualified support to NATO as it may
see NATO as useful in being an instrument of national
security and even protection against Soviet influence. At
the same time, they are opposed to American hegemony and
are seeking ways to reduce American influence if it is
compatible with domestic political realities. The PCI
would ultimately like to dissolve the alliance. [Ref. Ill]
The Spanish, who are not NATO members, have been
seeking to join NATO since the death of Franco. They
currently possess a 300,000 man military and a dominant
geographical position with respect to the Mediterranean
Sea, Atlantic Ocean, and the Straits of Gibraltar. Their
geographical location could play a strategic role in NATO
for air, land, and sea staging operations if they joined
the alliance. Because of this, NATO planners have long
considered Spain to be key terrain. The Spanish Communist
Party (PCE) currently attracts approximately ten percent of
the Spanish populus ' s total vote. The PCE does not want to
debate the NATO issue until 198 6; however, they have
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stated that they would support NATO Membership if the
Spanish Parliament approved it or if the Spanish people
approved it by referendum. [Ref. 112] Although the PCE is
a factor against Spanish entry into NATO, other factors
such as the US-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
(which expires in September 1981) , the Gibraltar question,
the Socialist Party's (PSOE) opposition to NATO membership,
and Spanish entry into the EEC compound the issue into a
highly complicated political question.
Robert Osgood summarizes the three Eurocommunist '
s
goals concerning the NATO question as follows:
PCI and PCF
Eurocommunists know that their party must be strategi-
cally correct and tactically wise in its pursuit of
political power, which alone permits attainment of
their ultimate goals. Therefore, the PCI and PCF, in
adjusting to the environments in which they seek power,
have renounced the "dictatorship of the proletariat."
They have also embraced democratic pluralism, free
elections, and Western liberties, although they con-
tinue to govern themselves by "democratic centralism.
"
They are also anxious to avoid assuming full power
and responsibility prematurely. The ultimate test of
the effect of the PCF and the PCI on NATO would be
their reaction to a Soviet or Soviet-supported
aggression against the NATO area. Insistent question-
ing by the press since 1976 has elicited scattered
concessions by PCI and PCF spokesmen that they would
oppose aggression from the East if it should occur.
[Ref. 113]
PCE
Under their leader, Santiago Carillo, the PCE has
been more outspoken than either the PCI or PCF in
rejecting Soviet leadership of the Communist movement
and in criticizing the East European as well as Soviet
regimes for their lack of democracy and their trans-
gression of human rights. Its support for both the
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EEC and an European Defense Community goes farther
than the PCE or PCF toward endorsing a West European
block that would be an alternative to either Soviet
or American dominance. Pending the creation of this
bloc, however, it supports US bases in Spain but
opposes Spain's entry into NATO, although it promises
to accept this event if the Spanish Parliament were
to vote for it. The importance of the PCE to American
interests springs not from its domestic power but from
its prominence among Eurocommunist parties by virtue
of Carillo's defiance of Moscow. [Ref. 114]
The overall Eurocommunist movement's influence on NATO
therefore is a function of their current national policies,
which could change drastically if one, or any, of the
Eurocommunist parties gained political control of their
respective countries at the polls. Because of this, NATO
would be faced with a moral question should Eurocommunists
attain seats of power in Italy, France, and to a lesser
degree (because of current non-NATO membership) in Spain.
Can the NATO countries, who are pledged to "safeguard the
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty,
and the rule of law" maintain their alliance with countries
that share governments with communists committed to an
antithetical political order? [Ref. 115] When asked about
this question, Henry Kissinger commented:
While the United States can never be indifferent to
the extension of Soviet hegemony to Western Europe,
the permanent stationing of American forces in Europe
could hardly be maintained for the object of defend-
ing some communist governments against other communist
governments. Such a deployment could be justified
only on the crudest balance of power grounds that would
be incompatible with American tradition and American
public sentiment. [Ref. 116]
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Therefore, the bottom line appears to be that the
formal acquisition of power by one or more Eurocommunist
parties would most probably compound the current problems
of eliciting support in the US and Western Europe for
financial and other measures necessary to sustain the
military, economic, and political cohesion of the alliance.
Because of this, the US and NATO have more to lose (in
comparison with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact) than to gain
from the potential effects of Eurocommunists in power.
However, the losses are neither so obvious or so great to
necessarily exert a drastic effect on American interests in
NATO or in NATO in general. In conclusion, the possible
effects of Eurocommunist movements, according to Osgood,
on the NATO Alliance are:
1. The effect on allied defense contributions and
policies where Communists are in positions of influence;
2. The effect on the response or anticipated response
of these allies to Soviet aggression against members
of NATO and adjacent countries, such as Yugoslavia,
and to crises short of war;
3. The effect on the US military role in NATO, particu-
larly on US troops in Europe and American use of naval
and air bases;
4. The effect on US military and economic support of
allies with Communists in their governments;
5. The effect on the military balance and political
cohesion among all the allies;
6. The direct effect on Soviet policy toward the West
through the impact on Soviet policies and actions and




7. The indirect effect on Soviet foreign relations
through the impact on relations between the East
European Communist governments and the Soviet Union;
8
.
The effect on democratic institutions and pro-




Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, France,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, and the US signed the North Atlantic Treaty and
thus formed NATO on April 4, 1949. As discussed in Chapter
I, the North Atlantic Treaty may be seen as supplementing
the Brussels Treaty of March 1948. The signing nations of
the Brussels Treaty, which now include Belgium, the FRG,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK, are
committed until 199 8 to give one another "all the military
and other aid and assistance in their power" if a signing
nation is the recipient of armed aggression in Western
Europe. Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty unites
Western Europe and North America in a commitment to
consult together if the security of any one member is
threatened. Because of this, armed attacks against member
nations are to be met by such actions as each of them deem
necessary, including the use of armed military forces, to
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic
region. Greece and Turkey joined the NATO Alliance in
1952. [Ref. 118] A protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty
was added by the Paris Agreements of 1954 which aimed at
strengthening the structure of NATO and revising the
Brussels Treaty of 1948. Briefly, the provisions of the
Paris Agreements were as follows:
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France, the United Kingdom and the United States
terminated the occupation regime in the Federal
Republic of Germany and recognized it as a sovereign
state. The Federal Republic of Germany undertook to
authorize the maintenance on its territory of foreign
forces at least at the strength obtained at the date
the agreements came into force.
The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy acceded
to the Brussels Treaty and the Western Union became
the Western European Union (WEU) . There was to be
extremely close cooperation between the WEU and NATO.
The Federal Republic of Germany was invited to
join NATO, contributing a national army to be inte-
grated into the forces of the alliance. Machinery
was set up to limit the strength of forces and
quantities of armaments which could be created within
the WEU.
The United States and the United Kingdom undertook
to maintain for as long as necessary their forces on
the European continent. A unified military formation
was to be established by assigning to the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe all member countries' forces,
with certain exceptions, stationed within the area of
his command.
In 1955, the FRG formally accepted the invitation
offered by the Paris Agreements and joined NATO. In 1966,
France formally withdrew from NATO's integrated military
organization. This was primarily because of former French
President Charles DeGaulle's desires for an independent
French security system and the French leader's perception
of NATO relying too excessively on the US nuclear umbrella
The French withdrawal from NATO's integrated military
organization did not, however, signify a total break from
the alliance, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
Also in 1966, the fourteen-nation NATO Defense Planning
Committee was formed with France being the only member
84

nation deciding not to join. In 1974, Greece left the
Defense Planning Committee because of internal problems
and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. [Ref. 120] However,
it gained full reinstatement to the committee in October of
1980. Spain, which has wanted to join NATO since Franco's
death, is hoping to join the alliance this year. Accord-
ing to Prime Minister Sotelo, Spain will formally apply
for NATO membership after the successful renegotiation of
the current US-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
is completed. [Ref. 121]
The North Atlantic Council is the governing body of
the alliance. Its headquarters is in Brussels and it
consists of ministers from the fifteen member countries,
who normally meet twice a year, and of ambassadors repre-
senting each government, who are in permanent session.
Since 1969, members can leave the alliance by giving a
one-year notice to the council. [Ref. 122]
Although NATO is obviously outnumbered in terms of
personnel and equipment by the Warsaw Pact, it is a common
misnomer (which I heard on numerous occasions from US and
West German soldiers during my forty-month tour of duty in
the FRG) to label NATO forces as "losers." In the first
place, the common comparison of divisional size units is
deceiving. For example, a typical Soviet division (Soviet
and Warsaw Pact divisions are organized alike) has
approximately 35 percent less personnel and equipment than
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its US or NATO counterpart. [Ref. 123] Its combat support
and combat service support, except in the area of bridging,
is also less sophisticated. [Ref. 124] Table 16 further
illustrates this by comparing Soviet armored and
mechanized divisions with like divisions of the US, FRG,
and UK.
Table 16
Comparison of Divisional Establishments
Armored Divisions
Soviet
U S FRG UK
1965 19 7 1975
Manpower 8.500 9000 9500 16.500 14,500 12,500
Tanks 316 316 32S 324 300 300
Lt. Tanks 17 17 19 54 — _
APCs — — _ _ _ _
Antitank Guns — — — 45 48
ATGM 9 9 105 370 29 30
Heavy Mortars 12 18 18 53 12 _
Med. Artillery 36 54 — 54 54 36
Heavy Artillery — — — 12 18 —






Manpower 10,000 11,000 12.000 16,300 14,500 15,700
Tanks 175 188 255 216 250 162
Light Tanks 17 17 19 54 - 156
APCs 180 180 270 322 280 270
Antitank Guns 12 18 18 - 45 —
ATGM 18 36 135 426 34 48
Heavy Mortar 54 54 54 49 36 —
Med. Artillery 36 54 72-90 54 54 45
Heavy Artillery — — — 12 18 -
Multiple Rocket 18 18 18 — 16 —
Launchers
Source: Armed Forces Journal (Washington: Army and
Navy Journal, Inc., December 1978), p. 40.
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Secondly and more importantly, the real reason the
"losers" syndrome is a misnomer lies within NATO itself.
The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who has always been
an American because of US nuclear weapons, has approxi-
mately 66 division-equivalent units available in peacetime.
This figure is significantly higher after mobilization.
NATO has some 3,100 tactical aircraft, based on about 2 00
standard NATO airfields, backed up by a system of jointly
financed storage depots, fuel pipelines, and signal
communications. The 2d French Corps, which consists of two
divisions and is not integrated into NATO forces, is
stationed in southern Germany under a status agreement
reached between the French and German governments. Co-
operation with NATO forces and the French command has been
agreed to between the commanders concerned. In addition,
the 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads that the US maintains
in NATO Europe should also be noted (in comparison to the
estimated 3,500 like Warsaw Pact warheads). [Ref. 125]
The Warsaw Pact may well be an alliance based upon
friendship, coordination, and mutual assistance; however,
it is not an alliance that is problem- free. One of its
greatest problems, the reliability of non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact members, deserves further discussion. Rumania is an
excellent initial example both politically and militarily
of this problem:
In the area of foreign policy, Rumania has openly
defied the Soviet Union or taken an independent stance
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on a number of important issues over the last decade.
For example, Rumania refused to sever relations with
Israel in 1967, normalized relations with the West
despite misgivings by the Soviets, and openly con-
demned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Further, the Rumanians have not only refused to
support Moscow in its conflict with Peking but have
maintained close and extensive ties with China.
Lately, in yet another challenge to the Soviets,
Bucharest has come out strongly in favor of
Eurocommunism and along with foreign political and
economic aspects, which by now have been well
documented in numerous Western studies, the Rumanian
deviation exhibits a significant military dimension,
which has some important implications for the Warsaw
Pact, both of a military-political and military-
strategic nature. For the pact, as well as for East-
West relations, these go well beyond Rumania's
nominal and political weight. [Ref. 126]
The sole objectives of the Rumanian concept of defense
are the preservation of national independence, state
sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the country.
[Ref. 127] Rumanian military writers make almost no
attempt to disguise the identity of their expected
aggressor. This expected aggressor, in their eyes, is the
Soviet Union. The writers further calculate, for example,
that to totally control the country's territory, an
aggressor would have to maintain an occupation force of up
to one million soldiers. This is not due to Rumania's
standing army. It is due to Rumania's compulsory
Patriotic Guard, which could total six million upon
mobilization. [Ref. 128] Given the circumstances of their
continuing membership in the Warsaw Pact, the Rumanians
have practiced what they preach to a remarkable degree.
Since 1962, they have refused to allow foreign troops on
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Rumanian soil for maneuvers and have themselves not partici-
pated in exercises outside their country since 1969. [Ref. 129]
Although Rumania is an excellent example, in terms of
reliability, of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, Professor Jiri
Valenta has stated in clear and concise terms his thoughts
concerning overall Warsaw Pact reliability. As Table 17
illustrates, this creates an advantage, although it is ex-
tremely hard to measure quantitatively, for the NATO Alliance.
The importance of the discussion on non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact forces' reliability is that it supports a widely held
contention that any Warsaw Pact attack into Western Europe
would be executed primarily by Soviet ground forces. Because
of this, the remaining non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces would
probably assume combat support and combat service support
roles in the assisting of Red Army offensive actions in
Western Europe. If this contention were to prove itself true,
it would create an advantage for NATO forces in that they
would not be directly defending against the maximum potential
forces of the entire Warsaw Pact.
The NATO of the 19 80s is being restructured because of
political decisions made, in the mid-1970s, to emphasize a
more flexible response. Although nuclear forces remain a key
element in the deterrent, a more credible level of conven-
tional defense is being adopted. [Ref. 130] This flexible
response restructuring is based upon critical short-term
defense improvements and a specific long-term defense program
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Based on traditional ties and
similar language with Soviet
Union, a backward country
possessing a large army that is
not considered to be decisive
in any future European conflict.
1968 intervention by Red Army
changed country's perception of
Soviet Union, possesses a strong
Western tradition, views Soviet
Union as inferiors, possibly
reliable in offensive mode only
in Warsaw Pact operations
directed against Poland.
Country has anti-Russian tradi-
tion but current leadership is
pro-Soviet, supports Soviet
Union as proxies in Zambia,
strong army that may not par-
ticipate in offensive actions
directed against the FRG.
1956 intervention by Red Army
changed country's perception of
Soviet Union, ties with
Catholic Church assist in
fueling anti-Russian sentiments,
country's army possesses a bad
military reputation.
Country's ties with Catholic
Church and current actions of
independent labor unions fuel
anti-Russian sentiments, con-
sidered 2d most important army
in Warsaw Pact.
Rumania y.QE£ii§^i§ Country's unsimilar language
Unreliable with Soviet Union fueled large
•cultural gap, army possesses
little modern equipment and is
not in command infrastructure
of Warsaw Pact, may be reliable
in offensive mode in Warsaw
Pact actions directed against
Hungary
.
Source: Jiri Valenta, the author received this informa-
tion during a class at the US Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California, on February 18, 1981. Professor
Valenta is an Associate Professor in the school's Department
of National Security Affairs and is the author of the Soviet
Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968 . For further information
on this subject, see the Volgyes-Herspring article in Armed




earlier, the short and long-term defense programs were a
result of former SACEUR Alexander Haig's 1976 SACEUR
Flexibility Studies.
The short-term defense improvements, which for the most
part were completed in 1978, are geared to give NATO an en-
hanced capability for meeting a short notice attack by the
Warsaw Pact. The short-term actions are centered around
antitank measures, war reserve stocks, readiness, and rein-
forcement. In the area of antitank measures, NATO has
increased its holdings of antitank weapons, modernized range-
finding equipment, and introduced other weapons, such as TOW
Cobra gunships, capable of countering Warsaw Pact armored
forces. War reserve stocks in selected categories were up-
graded, improving not only quality but also quantity and
availability for early utilization. Readiness and reinforce-
ment measures dealt with such items as early passage of
command, higher manning levels, training, and actions
designed to facilitate the movement of reinforcements from
US, Canada, and Great Britain. [Ref. 131]
The long-term defense program (LTDF) is of far more im-
portance to NATO as it aims at effectively improving NATO's
overall deterrence by improving the conventional force
structure throughout the 1980s. If the program is implemen-
ted as proposed, it may give NATO an overall advantage over
the Warsaw Pact in a conventional conflict. The current
Director of the British Atlantic Committee, Brigadier
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Kenneth Hunt, has clearly stated his views concerning the
LTDP as follows:
We have it within our capacity, because of Western
technological skills, to open up this quality gap
again—if we spend the money. This is what the NATO
LTDP is about—but it is long term, and some of it may
never happen. Until the LTDP measures take hold, our
conventional defenses are not likely to be able to
maintain the integrity of NATO territory with any
certainty and will have difficulty in buying enough
time for negotiation from any position of strength.
[Ref. 132]
The LTDP is based upon ten separate task forces, each
analyzing a specific high priority program area, each under
a Task Force Director. The Task Force Directors recommend
whatever seems essential to carrying out the programs
efficiently. The ten high priority task force areas and
some of their more important aspects are:
The Readiness Task Force, building on the short-
term readiness measures, aims at increasing the responsi-
veness of standing forces, selected reserve units and
civil support in time of tension, crisis, or early
hostilities. It is focusing on improving NATO's alert
machinery, including early commitment of NATO forces,
orienting the NATO exercise program more heavily to
readiness and interoperability and improving armor/anti-
armor capability and defense against radiological,
biological, and chemical warfare.
The reinforcement Task Force is also building on the
short-term measures to further improve the movement and
allied reception of strategic reserves from the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. In this connec-
tion, the US has already accelerated the reconstitution
of prepositioned overseas material conscribed to unit
sets (POMCUS) stocks and will probably propose further
enhancement of badly needed strategic airlift capabilities
The Reserve Mobilization Task Force is recommending
the quickest and most effective means of mobilizing
assigned, earmarked and other reserve forces. It also
deals with rapid mobilization of reservists to bring
standing forces up to wartime strength.
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The NATO Maritime Posture Task Force seeks to
increase the capability of allied navies to operate as
a joint, collective fighting force, including greater
interoperability and standardization in communications,
munitions, logistics and tactics.
The Air Defense Task Force is reviewing land-based
air defense. Its goal is to achieve the making of an
integrated complex of weapons, organization and air
command and control systems that is needed to deal
effectively with the increasing Warsaw Pact air threat.
The Communications, Command and Control Task Force
is aiming at an integrated command and control system
with greater commonality in doctrine, procedures,
organizational structure, personnel, equipment, facili-
ties and standardization communications. This is a top
priority goal of both SACEUR and SACLANT.
The Electronic Warfare Task Force is reviewing
priorities for practical long-term improvement in the
entire EW spectrum of concepts and procedures, intelli-
gence, equipment and systems, standardization and inter-
operability, manpower, teaming, management, and funding.
The Rationalization Task Force is developing plans
and procedures for harmonizing allied R&D and
armaments production, as is essential for achieving
standardization or at least interoperability.
The Consumer Logistics Task Force proposes an
improved NATO logistics structure, including steps for
better common logistical support of operational plans,
and for better civil support of military operations.
The Theater Nuclear E'orce Modernization Task Force
is developing a long-term program to insure that theater
nuclear forces continue to perform their key role in
deterrence, and are adequately stable and survivable.
[Ref. 133]
NATO is also a relatively strong and healthy political
alliance. This does not mean that the alliance had no
problems in this area. The NATO problems of European
political will and Eurocommunism were discussed extensively
in the previous chapter. However, NATO's political
problems (i.e. Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and the
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current Polish crisis) are definitely not of the same
political magnitude or type as the Warsaw Pact's.
In the US, a substantial majority of Americans accept the
fact that the cornerstone of US foreign policy is its commit-
ment to European defense. Sixty-two percent of Americans
believe the US should come to the assistance of its European
allies in the event of their attack by the Warsaw Pact.
Furthermore, Americans oppose any reduction of US forces in
Europe, by a margin of three to one. [Ref. 13 4] The alliance
also has taken a political stand as to the Soviet Union's
1979 occupation of Afghanistan. The following statement
reflects the consensus of the members of NATO's North
Atlantic Council:
The North Atlantic Council, joined by senior representa-
tives from capitals, met on 15 January 1980 as part of
the alliance's continuing consultations on the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and its consequences for East/West
relations and for the alliance. They expressed full
support for the United Nations General Assembly resolution
of 14 January last and denounced the Soviet action. The
Soviet invasion contravenes fundamental principles of
international behavior and represents a serious blow to
alliance efforts to build a framework of constructive
relations with the Soviet Union. The situation created by
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan will remain at the
center of allied concern and consultation. [Ref. 135]
NATO is also healthy enough to tackle broad political
problems. NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society (CCMS) , which was established in 1969, is working
on environmental affairs. The committee has produced
computer-based information systems relating to geothermal
energy, a memoranda of understanding that obligates members
to share a new documentation as to solar energy, periodic
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symposia information on high temperature engine ceramics
and international technical meetings on air quality
modeling. [Ref. 136] In comparison, the Warsaw Pact has no
known organizational infrastructure to address broad
political problems such as the environment.
The next NATO advantage addressed in this chapter deals
with the current and future aspects of the newly emphasized
Sino-NATO relationship. In a recent lecture at the US Naval
Postgraduate School, Professor Parr is K. Chang referred to
the PRC as being "the 16th member of NATO. " Professor
Chang further explained this by emphasizing that it is in
China's benefit militarily to assist in the promotion of a
united and strong NATO. Furthermore, the newly found
Chinese ideology, which stems from the failures of the
Cultural Revolution and China's recognizing of the failures
of the Soviet system, has created a new Chinese attitude
which is seeking new ties with Western Europe and the US.
[Ref. 137] The China factor has already benefited NATO.
This is because the Soviets and Chinese share a long border,
ideological disagreements, and territorial differences. The
territorial differences are real enough to have already
resulted (primarily in the late 1960s) in armed clashes, and
Soviet concerns are deep enough to have deployed approxi-
mately 45 divisions on its Eastern flank. Because NATO's
Western flank is the Atlantic Ocean, NATO obtains the obvious
advantage of not having to prepare or potentially contend
with a two-front war when the China factor is considered.
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According to US Array Lt.Col. Al Eiegel while he was
assigned to the US Army Russian Institute, Garmish, FRG,
the Kremlin also considers the PRC figuratively as the 16th
member of NATO. This is illustrated by Western European
arms sales to the PRC and the US ' s refusal to halt the
flow of arms and technology to China. [Ref. 138] By
analyzing the Soviet media, Lt.Col. Biegel has identified
perceptions of the Kremlin concerning the Sino-NATO
military connection. These perceptions, according to the
Kremlin, are a result of the following anti-Soviet
Chinese goals:
Weakening the relative power of the Soviet Union
and its leadership role in the socialist bloc.
Increasing the level of tension between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact to justify increasing arms expendi-
tures and to divert the USSR's attention from the
Sino-Soviet border by encouraging the enhancement of
NATO's military potential.
Supporting the consolidation of West European
unity, politically, militarily, and economically to
confront the Soviet Union.
Undermining Moscow's attempts to promote detente,
reduction of armaments and other proposals to reduce
tensions in Europe, i.e., MBFR and the Helsinki
Agreement.
Creating a "two-front" threat against the Soviet
Union by means of a formidable anti-Soviet alliance
structure consisting of the US, Japan, China, and
Western Europe. This new form of containment policy
would enhance the PRC's ability to pursue its own
expansionist goals in Asia.
Seeking to gain access to Western arms and related
technology in order to modernize its armed forces and
modify its military strategy. [Ref. 139]
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For years, Western spokesmen have felt that NATO could
counter the Warsaw Pact's advantage in sheer numbers by
stressing other factors which equalized the equation.
The most important of these other factors was NATO's
perceived superiority as to its overall quality of equip-
ment. [Ref. 140] Simply put , Western technology has, since
the early 1970s, seldom been questioned in its overall
ability to field clearly superior military equipment. A
US Congressional Inquiry on American and Soviet Armed
Services Strength Comparison established in 1977 that the
US was clearly technologically superior in the following
23 areas:









8. Small turbofan engines
9. Space technology






16. ECM and ECCM
17. Look-down shoot-down systems
18. Precision-guided munitions
19. Remotely piloted vehicles
20. Satellite sensors
21. Strategic cruise missiles
22. Survivable submarines
23. Tactical nuclear weapons [Ref. 141]
However, the current advantage NATO possesses over the
Warsaw Pact in weapons quality appears to be rapidly
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declining. The Warsaw Pact, most noticeably the Soviet
Union, is making rapid improvements in the performance of
almost all of their weapons, and are rapidly overtaking
NATO's superiority in technological excellence. The
reason for this drastic technological improvement by the
Warsaw Pact is that the organization, most noticeably the
Soviet Union, is spending more money more efficiently than
the NATO Alliance. [Ref. 142] Table 18 illustrates the
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Source: "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Good-Small vs
Good-Big," The Economist (August 9, 1980), p. 35.
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In the forthcoming book NATO's Strategic Options: Arms
Control and Defense
, Thomas Callaghan will state in his
chapter that "successive American Secretaries of State have
estimated that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are devoting
approximately the same resources to the development,
production, training, maintenance, operation, and support
of general purpose forces. What do these roughly equal
resource commitments produce?"
For the Warsaw Pact it produces a massive,
standardized collective force, capable of operating
effectively together.
For NATO it produces a de-standardized and non-
interoperable collection of national forces, qualita-
tively uneven, quantitatively inferior, unable to
fight for the same period of time at the same munitions
expenditure rates, and with only a limited ability to
rearm, refuel, repair, reinforce, support, supply, or
even communicate with, one another. [Ref. 143]
To stem the current trend in this area, Callaghan suggests
a new treaty, originally within the NATO Alliance, which
would revive the spirit of the Marshall Plan. This
agreement would deny the Soviets Western technology as long
as the Soviets continue their current expansionistic
policies and force the Western nations to collectively and
rationally pool their technological and industrial wealth.
If implemented, the plan would, for the first time, force
NATO to pursue "a coherent and mutually reinforcing
strategy of collective defense, deterrence, and detente."
[Ref. 144] Regardless of whether Callaghan* s or a similar
plan is implemented, the NATO Alliance's qualitative edge
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in weaponry will become a thing of the past within this
decade if the status quo in this area remains unchanged.
The final current NATO advantage this chapter will
assess addresses NATO's enhanced nuclear decision making
capability in comparison with the Warsaw Pact's. In
simple terms, NATO's three (US, UK, and France) nuclear
capable members are better able to represent the feelings
of the entire NATO Alliance than the Warsaw Pact's one
(USSR) nuclear capable member in matters dealing with
nuclear release. NATO considers this three-pronged
capability to be one which complicates the efforts of
Warsaw Pact planners and increases NATO's overall deter-
rent. This feeling was reinforced by the approval of the
1974 Ottawa Declarations on Atlantic relations. Article
One of the declaration states:
The members of the North Atlantic Alliance declare
that the treaty signed 25 years ago to protect their
freedom and independence has confirmed their common
destiny. Under the shield of the treaty, the allies
have maintained their security permitting them to
preserve the values which are the heritage of their
civilization and enabling Western Europe to rebuild
from its ruins and lay the foundations of its unity.
[Ref. 145]
Articles Five and Six of the declaration touch on, in
unclassified terms, NATO's perceived enhanced nuclear
decision making capability. These articles state:
The essential elements in the situation which gave
rise to the treaty have not changed. While the
commitment of all the allies to the common defense
reduces the risk of external aggression, the contri-
bution to the security of the entire alliance
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provided by the nuclear forces of the United States
based in the United States as well as in Europe and
by the presence of North American forces in Europe
remains indispensable. Nevertheless, the alliance
must pay careful attention to the dangers to which
it is exposed in the European region, and must adopt
all measures necessary to avert them. The European
members who provide three-quarters of the conventional
strength of the alliance in Europe, and two of whom
possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent
role of their own, contributing to the overall
strengthening of the deterrence of the alliance, under-
take to make the necessary contribution to maintain
the common defense at a level capable of deterring and
if necessary repelling all actions directed against the
independence and territorial integrity of the members
of the alliance. [Ref. 146]
The Warsaw Pact and NATO assessments, outlined in the
form of advantages in this and the preceding chapter, are
not the only ones each side possesses. They are, however,
some of the most current and controversial issues plaguing,
in one way or another, both sides today.
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V. NATO EUROPE'S ECONOMIC POWER POTENTIAL
NATO Europe's economic power potential is a critical
and current question as it relates to desired increased
NATO defense expenditures, new NATO missions, and, most
importantly, NATO Europe's ability to offset, in economic
terms, the potential future withdrawal of a portion of
the present US troop commitment in Western Europe, if
necessary. This chapter will reinforce, but not repeat,
Chapter I's previous findings in regards to NATO's
decreased defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP and
NATO vulnerability in terms of oil imports. The chapter
will briefly discuss each NATO country's current economic
posture in macro terms, declining European and North
American birthrates, and NATO's current and past cost
sharing formulas. From this discussion, a conclusion
will be presented to summarize overall economic viability
within the alliance with particular emphasis being placed
on NATO Europe's economic power potential. The ultimate
question this chapter proposes to answer is: "Could the
European NATO countries devote an increased amount to the
defense sector of their respective governments in the
future if events indicated the necessity to do so?" In
order to answer this question a brief outline of each
individual NATO country's economy is needed.
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Before starting a country-by-country outline, it must
be stated that there is an initial problem in terms of hov/
to measure the performance of an economy. This chapter's
attempt will focus primarily on selected key indicators
of the supply and demand sides of macro-economic
performance such as GNP, GDP, per capita income, employment
characteristics, inflation, indicators of living standards,
and foreign trade. [Ref. 14 7] The difference between GNP
and GDP is that Gross Domestic Product at market prices is
the market value of a country's output attributable to
factors of production located in the territory of the
given country. It differs from Gross National Product by
the exclusion of net factor income payments, such as
interest and dividends, received from, or paid to, the rest
of the world. [Ref. 148] At the conclusion of the country-
by-country outlines, statistical tables will be formulated
to highlight key NATO country economic indicators.
Economic activity in Belgium recovered, from a sluggish
1978-1979 period, in the latter part of 1979 as a result
of the favorable economic situation of Belgium's main
customers and an upturn in household consumption. GNP
grew at a rate of just under 3 percent in 1979. However,
this recovery did not improve the employment situation,
despite governmental support measures, and unemployment
has reached the 7 percent level. In the second half of
1979, inflation was relatively modest at 4 . 7 percent with
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wages increasing at a figure just under the inflation rate.
Because current expenditures have grown more than expected,
a budget deficit of approximately 10 percent over receipts
has become the norm. Monetary policy has become pro-
gressively more restrictive and interest rates have risen
substantially because of international constraints and
exchange rate pressures. The country is a net importer of
goods with an export to import ratio of 144/152. [Ref. 149]
Canadian GDP, at market prices, grew by an average rate
of 3.4 percent between 1973 and 1978. It is currently
rising at a slightly higher rate due to an increase of
exports. The country is helped tremendously by its oil
supplies and known reserves. Inflation, in 1979, was at
the 10 percent level with wages increasing at a 12.2
percent rate for the same period. The unemployment level
is currently less than 5 percent. Canada is a net
exporter of goods with an export to import ratio of 46/43.
[Ref. 150]
Denmark is just beginning to recover from the two oil
price increases of the mid-1970s. This is due to a large
number of measures that have been taken over the past few
years which have included substantial tax increases, public
expenditure cuts, and two adjustments of the exchange rate
in late 1979. The steady rise in unemployment was
reversed in 1979 and presently stands at 5.3 percent of the
labor force. The rate of inflation, which had abated in
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1978 due to a decline of import prices, reaccelerated in
1979. At the end of 1979, inflation was running at 11.5
percent which was less than the 13.5 percent increase in
wages throughout the same period. Denmark is a net
importer of goods with an export to import ratio of
146/184. Prospects for the future point to a slight fall
in real GDP, a deterioration of labor market conditions,
and no easing of domestic inflationary pressures. [Ref . 151]
France's economic successes and failures are built
upon three decades of French economic planning that
attempts to combine the dynamic forces of a market system
with explicit consideration of the ways in which markets
can be used to serve collectively determined social goals.
In principle, it works to create the sense of direction
that would make economic growth more constructive. [Ref.
152] GDP in 1979 increased at a rate of 2.9 percent which
reflects a slight slowdown in reference to the 1972-1978
period. Inflation is steadily increasing and was approach-
ing the 11 percent level in October 1979, however, wages
have, since 1975, continually increased at a slightly
higher rate than the rate of inflation. France is a net
importer of goods with an import to export ratio of
76/81 and has an unemployment rate of approximately 4
percent. [Ref. 153]
1979 was a highly satisfactory one economically for the
FRG. Demand expanded strongly and unemployment fell.
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Rapid growth in Germany's imports also boosted activity
in other European countries. In 1979, GNP increased by
4.4 percent which was somewhat higher than expected.
Total employment increase was somewhat higher than the
growth of the labor foces which resulted in a decline in
unemployment from 3.8 percent in 1978 to 3 . 3 percent in
1979. The inflation rate, which had fallen to nearly 2
percent in 1978, just exceeded 5 percent in 1979.
Germany's import growth further accelerated the past
deterioration of price competitiveness due to exchange
rate developments. The FRG is a net exporter of goods
with an export to import ratio in 1979 of 142/120. For
the future, business investment should remain reasonably
strong and help to limit the rise in unemployment, 1980
and 1981 tax reduction should also help to keep up demand
and unemployment, and the rise of import prices will help
put only moderate pressure on the domestic price level.
[Ref. 154] At this time, it is necessary to discuss the
FRG further. Its economy has been called the "economic
miracle" because of its vast growth and productivity, yet
it would be unrealistic to assume there are no economic
problems. Long-term private investment suffers from an
excessively high rate of interest and a lack of confidence
by the investors. The FRG, like most developed countries,
also faces the problems of a high wage country that is
called upon to open their markets to the products of less
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developed countries. These problems revolve around the
export of unfinished goods and the import of cheap goods
which compete with domestically produced goods. And
finally, the economic growth of the FRG is dependent upon
the innovative spirit of the business community and the
cooperation of the labor unions. [Ref. 155]
Greece's economic performance in 1979 was, in
particular, characterized by an acceleration in the rate of
inflation to the 25 percent level. 19 79 showed a marked
slowdown in the expansion of the economy largely attribu-
table to escalating oil prices. 1979 GDP grew by just
over 3.5 percent compared with 6 percent in 1978. This
decline is largely explained by the sharp 1979 decline in
agricultural production. Personal income rose, during the
same period, at a rate of 22.5 percent. The slowdown in
economic activity has not noticeably affected the
unemployment rate, which has remained fairly constant for
the past three years at approximately 7 percent. Greece is
a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio in
1979 of 38/96. For the future, demand and activity are
expected to remain weak with unemployment moderately
rising but remaining at a fairly low level. [Ref. 156]
Greater long-term improvements may also occur as a result




Italy's economic recovery, which began at the end of
1978, continued in 1979 and 1980. This was sustained by a
marked growth of private fixed investment and private
consumption. GDP increased by nearly 5 percent and this
brisk rate of activity has added some growth in employment
although the rate of unemployment, currently at 7.7
percent, has increased slightly from 1978. Wage growth far
exceeded the rate of inflation with wage earners receiving
increases of approximately 20 percent compared with an
average increase in consumer prices of 15 percent. While
the economy's growth performance in 1979 was satisfactory,
its ability to fight inflation has been unsatisfactory.
Italy's inflation rate for the last half of 1979 was 16.8
percent. The rise of oil prices, naturally, has played a
major role in the accelerated inflation rate. Italy is
just barely a net importer of goods with an export to
import ratio of 56/5 5. For the future, a more marked
downturn in activity and/or a stronger acceleration of
inflation are anticipated. [Ref. 157]
An upswing in Luxembourg's economic activity, largely
attributable to the steel industry, began in 1978 and
continued throughout 1979. Rising steel orders have
stimulated an upturn in production and growth of steel
exports. GDP growth of 4.3 percent was achieved in 1978 as
compared wtih 1.7 percent in 1977. This stabilized the
employment situation resulting in a 1978 unemployment rate
of 7 percent. From July 1978 to July 1979, wages
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increased at a rate of 5.7 percent compared with an
inflation rate of 4.5 percent. Luxembourg is a net
importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 86/90.
Its economic growth rate is expected to ease in 1981 with
GDP growth only estimated at 1.25 percent. Inflation is
also expected to be more rapid than the previous two years,
reaching approximately 5 percent. [Ref. 158]
After the 19 75 world recession, the Netherlands
experienced an upswing in domestic demand, which culminated
in an investment boom in 1977. At the same time, exports
were depressed by a substantial loss in market share. The
result of these trends was a weakness in overall output
growth and continuing high levels of unemployment. In 1979,
domestic demand weakened, while the general European
upswing, especially in terms of the FRG, led to a strong
recovery of exports. Because of this, 1979 GDP rose by
almost 3 percent. Also during this timeframe, inflation
remained at a moderate 4.5 percent, unemployment stood at
a relatively high, but stable, 5.1 percent, and wages
increased by 6 . 5 percent. The Netherlands is a net
importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 50/52.
Forecasts for 1980-1981 suggest an unsatisfactory low rate
of growth. Oil price increases are expected to lead to a
sluggishness of foreign markets and to an erosion of real
personal income. GDP growth is forecast to fall from 3 to
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1 percent and inflation is expected to increase from 4.5
to 7 percent. [Ref. 159]
1978 and 1979 witnessed a marked improvement in the
Norwegian economy. Because of a tight credit policy and
a sixteen month wage and price freeze, which ended
December 31, 1979, wage and price increases have decelera-
ted to a yearly rate of less than 5 percent. The
consequent improvement in competitiveness, on the inter-
national scene, coupled with a strong foreign demand have
resulted in a significant decline in the country's
external budget deficit. 1978 and 1979 growth of GDP was
3.5 and 3 percent respectively. The half percent
deceleration in GDP growth is entirely attributable to
higher oil prices. In 1979, the rate of Norwegian
unemployment averaged 1.4 percent, compared with an average
rate of 1 percent over the four previous years . Although
inflation is rising, the 1979 inflation figure was only
4.75 percent. Wages, for the same period, only increased
at a rate of 4.5 percent as wage earners have suffered a
small decrease in disposable income for the past two years.
Norway is a net importer of goods with an export to import
ratio of 10/11. The Norwegian outlook is clouded by more
uncertainty than usual, and real GDP growth for 1980-1981
was expected to accelerate only slightly. Higher oil
prices coupled with increased Norwegian oil and gas output
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could bring the current external balance into a slight
surplus during this period. [Ref. 160]
The Portuguese economy, in 1979 , witnessed a number of
positive developments centered on the brisk advance of
exports, due to a slower growth of wage costs and currency
depreciation, and the recovery of output, which was
particularly impressive during the second half of the year,
GDP growth in 19 79 was 4 percent compared to 3.5 percent
the previous year. Prices and incomes also showed some
positive features and although inflation remained at the
24 percent level for 1979, it has recently slowed down due
to price controls and the slower depreciation of the
escudo. Real wage increases declined in 1979 to the 20
percent level. Portugal's unemployment rate failed to
increase for the first time since 1974, in 1979, and has
stabilized at the 8.2 percent rate. The country is a net
importer of goods with an export to import ratio of 34/65.
Forecasts for 1980-1981 are clouded by uncertainties and
exacerbated by the lack of information on current economic
trends. It is particularly difficult to tell to what
extent the Portuguese economy will be affected by higher
oil process and the world's economic slowdown. However,
GDP is expected to grow by approximately 3 percent with




The Turkish economy has passed through a very difficult
period in the past four years. The inflation rate has
been the highest of all NATO countries, reaching 80 percent
on a yearly basis by the end of 1979. At the same time,
GDP growth came to a virtual standstill and although
structural unemployment did not worsen as much as might
have been anticipated, industrial capacity fell sharply
because of the country's growing difficulties in earning
or borrowing enough foreign money in order to pay for
imports of oil, raw materials, and spare parts. During
this same period, Turkish real wages increased at a rate of
only 50 percent which was approximately 30 percent below
the rate of inflation. GDP increased at a rate of 1 per-
cent in 1979 compared to 4 percent in 1978. The country's
unemployment rate is fluctuating between 12-16 percent.
Turkey is a net importer of goods with an export to import
ratio of 22/45. For the future, Turkey is implementing new
policy approaches that represent a realistic approach to a
difficult problem. Initially, the impact of new measures
may accelerate inflation and unemployment may rise even
higher. However, in the long run, the economy is expected
to respond assuming no drastic oil price increases. [Ref.
162]
In contrast to 1978, Great Britain's economic
performance in 1979 was characterized by little growth,
accelerating inflation, and a sizeable current external
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deficit. Because of a new government being elected in
May 1979, the direction of governmental policy has changed
towards a greater reliance on the control of the money
supply. Although it may be too early to judge the
government's policies in this area, the policies are
controversial current-day topics in the United Kingdom.
The rate of inflation in 1979 was 16 percent which was
double the 1978 rate of 8 percent. Disposable income rose
by only 7 percent and 5 percent respectively during the
same period. GDP rose at a rate of 3.25 percent in 1979
which is considerably higher than the average rate over
the last ten years. Unemployment figures are rising
steadily yet remain fairly modest with a figure of 5.4
percent being reported in January of 1980. Great Britain
is a net importer of goods with an export to import ratio
of 71/78. With market activity turning down after mid-1979,
a 1980-1981 fall of about 2 percent is expected in GDP
along with considerable rise in the unemployment figures.
However, a weakness of domestic demand and expected self-
sufficiency in oil should moderate the rise in imports,
leading to a small surplus in future external account
balances. [Ref. 163]
Economic activity in the United States has been
generally buoyant to 1980 following the 1975-1976 recession.
1980 unfolded a mild recession which produced higher
interest rates, inflation, and a rise in the unemployment
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rate. In the first half of 1979, the oil situation led
to a deterioration in the US's overall balance of payments.
The country's poor inflation record over the past few
years is the latest state of an acceleration which began in
1976. 1979 inflation was approximately 13.6 percent with
wage increases lagging significantly behind inflation at
9.1 percent. Unemployment has remained, since 19 78, at
approximately the 6 to lh percent level. It is currently
above this level but not expected to go above 8^ percent.
The US is a net importer of goods with an export to import
ratio of 143/173. For the future, the magnitude and
duration in the drop in US activity, the degree to which it
may be exacerbated by energy problems or reactions that
jeopardize progress in reducing inflation and the ability
for US policy to respond correctly, are open to doubt.
Forecasts for 1981 indicate a higher level of unemployment
(in the 8^ percent area) and an underlying rate of
inflation of approximately 10 percent. The major policy
problem for the Reagan Administration therefore, may be to
assess how inflation and inflationary expectations can be
reduced, and what are the potential costs and benefits of
alternative policy options. [Ref. 164] Tables 19, 20, and
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BASIC NATO ECONOMIC COMPARISONS
1978 PER PRIVATE COMSUMPTION PASSENGER CARS
CAPITA INCOME IN DOLLARS FOR 1977 PER 100
COUNTRY IN DOLLARS INHABITANTS IN 1976
Belgium 9818 5000 279
Canada 8766 4870 388
Denmark 10872 5080 265
France 8827 4450 300
FRG 10426 4690 308
Greece 3355 1890 55
Italy 4180 2220 283
Luxembourg 9859 4760 367
Netherlands 9364 4480 273
Norway 9778 4940 253
Portugal 1864 1260 107
Turkey 1129 810 11
UK 5514 2580 255
US 9602 5600 505
SOURCE
:





BASIC NATO ECONOMIC COMPARISONS
1979 ANNUAL 1978 EXPORT OF 1978 IMPORT OF
RATE OF GOODS IN MILLIONS GOODS IN MILLIONS
COUNTRY INFLATION OF DOLLARS OF DOLLARS
Belgium 4.7 44808 48360
Canada 10 46152 43560
Denmark 11.5 11844 14760
France 11 76464 81684
FRG 5.1 142092 120672
Greece 7 3336 7560
Italy 16.8 55956 56394
Luxembourg 4.5
Netherlands 4.5 50016 52872
Norway 4.7 10044 11424
Portugal 24 2436 5172
Turkey 80 2280 4548
UK 16.5 71676 78588
US 13.6 143664 173292





There is another statistical group of facts that are
seldom discussed with economic indicators. This is the
birthrate, which directly affects the manpower available
as a resource of countries with relatively large military
industrial complexes and organizations. Its lack of large
scale discussion is most probably, especially in Europe
and North America, due to the fact that it appears to be
affecting the countries in these geographical areas
similarly and in a manner conducive to further non-
military governmental planned development. Basically, this
means that European and North American birth rates are
declining in a manner that appears to be advantageous in
terms of future planned development considering the
world's overall depletion of many of its non-renewable
natural resources. For countries in these areas with
developed militaries, the declining birthrates are more
significant as they indicate to military planners that
future resources, in terms of military manpower, will
become more scarce. Some examples of the declining
European birthrate include: the FRG's decline from
1,050,345 in 1966 to 582,344 in 1977; Greece's decline
from 1,016,120 in 1964 to 781,638 in 1976; Norway's
decline from 63,005 in 1959 to 50,877 in 1977; and
finally, Poland's decline from 790,547 in 1955 to 520,383
in 1967. [Ref. 165]
118

The main significances of the European birthrate
figures are that they appear to be uniform in nature
throughout most of Europe and that they indicate future
potential military manpower levels will be obtained from a
smaller total available pool of men and women. Therefore,
the availability of military manpower will become more
scarce and the price of maintaining that manpower in the
future will naturally increase. Table 22 indicates that
the US, like Europe, is currently experiencing the same
phenomenon.
TABLE 2 2
US BIRTH AND DEATH RATES: 1960-1978




-Infant death rate (per J,COO live briths)
Jirth rate
Death rale
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Source: Chart prepared ti; -U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Data from U.S. National Center (or Health Statistics.
The final economic aspect this chapter will discuss is
the US share of the current and past NATO budgets. The
cost of NATO projects is currently shared by all of the 13
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NATO countries having committed military forces (excludes
Iceland)
.
When France participates in programs such as
air defense, the figure is increased to 14 members. NATO
international staffs and permanent national representatives
manage the programs. Actual procedures are carried out
under the auspices of NATO's most recent (May 19 79) cost
sharing formula. [Ref. 166] The following table and chart
(See Tables 23 and 24) indicate the current and past break-
down of the cost sharing formulas and the US share of
total NATO funding. From this table and chart, one can
readily establish US current and past generosity, in
fiscal terms, toward the Atlantic Alliance.
In conclusion, the fifteen countries presently in NATO
represent an economic environment, amongst its members,
that illustrates extreme good to extreme bad in terms of
various economic indicators. The countries, from top to
bottom, show a remarkable difference in economic develop-
ment. Simply put, some NATO countries have strong
economies whereas others have weak economies. Simple
geography, it appears, plays an extremely important role
regarding these countries' economic wherewithal. The "have"
countries are located in North America and continental
Europe whereas the "have not" countries are located on the
Iberian Peninsula or the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.
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France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries all
have solid industrial eocnomies with only minor to
moderate economic problems. The "have not" countries
include Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Turkey. These
countries all have serious economic problems, with one in
particular, namely Turkey, currently on the verge of
economic collapse. In reviewing and analyzing the fifteen
member countries, it is now more apparent why increased
defense spending is such a hot political issue in many of
the member countries, to include some of the countries I
have placed in the "have" category. In the "have"
countries, increased defense spending obviously is a
tenable possibility that revolves more around the
political will of the countries than economic considera-
tions. In the "have not" countries, increased defense
spending, without a serious domestic outcry, is probably
out of the question. Additionally, the alliance's overall
economic situation is, to a great degree, dependent upon
the availability of Mid-East oil supplies as discussed in
Chapter I.
The additional problems involving declining European
and North American birthrates, the history of NATO cost
sharing, and the current US share of total NATO spending
further complicate the situation on both sides of the
Atlantic. However, this chapter's original question on
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increased NATO Europe's defense spending can be answered.
In a nutshell, NATO Europe's ability to increase defense
spending is influenced by geographical location and
political will more than economic motives. Additionally,
the US appears to be footing an excessive proportion of
the total NATO bill considering several of NATO Europe's
members have economies that are equal to or surpass the
US ' s in several established economic indicators.
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VI. CURRENT US OPTIONS TOWARD NATO
This chapter will look at four US options towards NATO
Option I would increase US conventional troop presence in
NATO by 10 percent. Option II would withdraw all US
conventional troops in NATO. Option III would withdraw
25-50 percent of all US conventional troops in NATO.
Finally, Option IV would maintain the status quo. While
there are innumerable other options, as well as other
options within the options presented, it is my intent only
to determine some parameters affecting basic policy
regarding conventional force levels. The details of this
basic policy could be worked out at a later date.
A. OPTION I
In this option, the US would increase its conventional
troop presence in Europe by 10 percent in accordance with
a carefully planned timetable if a similar increase was
implemented by the other NATO members. While this may be
the best overall solution from an European point of view,
it would further paralyze the US in trying to meet the
requirements of the one and a half war strategy, thus
exacerbating the US problem of projecting forces into
areas to attempt to insure the continued availability of
petroleum and raw materials which the Europeans and
125

ourselves will so desperately need in the future. It
would also require our European allies, to substantially
increase their own force levels and, more importantly,
their defense budgets. As mentioned earlier, the Carter
Administration found that this was a virtual impossibility.
However, the new Reagan Administration has made it clear
that our NATO allies should not expect the US to
continually add to its force posture in Europe if other
NATO nations do not increase their own. [Ref. 167] This
was probably a reaction to recent British defense cuts and
the rumors of a partial troop withdrawal of British Army
of the Rhine (EAOR) forces. In an effort to reduce
defense spending, Britain's new Secretary of State for
Defense, John Nott, recently announced FY 19 82 defense cuts
of $484 million. [Ref. 168] To further reduce spending,
rumors are circulating in both Brussels and London that the
new defense minister may scale down (withdraw) a portion of
the 55,000 troops currently deployed with the BAOR. This
withdrawal would be done under the auspices of placing more
emphasis on the UK's future planned nuclear strike force
(Trident and SLCM)
,
providing the Royal Navy with more
assets, and saving a portion of the $1.7 billion the BACP.
is currently costing the Crown annually. [Ref. 16 9]
A British defense correspondent has recently written
that NATO should extend its own area of operation into
areas such as the Indian Ocean in order to better defend US
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and other NATO countries' national interests. Yet he
concludes, under the option that calls for increased troop
strengths, that it is probably not realistic as it is
"difficult to persuade the allies to provide sufficient
resources for the area that already exists, let alone
press them for more." [Ref. 170] Former British Chief of
Defense Staff (Lord) Carver stated that such a proposal
would threaten the cohesion of the alliance. [Ref. 171]
Although this option could be construed as a show of
force against the Soviets and raise the current nuclear
threshold, it would also probably free the Soviets from
considering this to be a price to pay for future
aggressive actions (i.e., Poland) in the East European
arena.
In general, this option appears to be unrealistic from
a US perspective as it would further obligate resources
required to meet the one and a half war strategy and would
also obligate the other NATO members to increase troop
levels and defense budgets along the same lines as US
increases. Given the current and past history of NATO
defense expenditure increases, I feel safe to say that the
political will to accomplish such increases does not exist.
B. OPTION II
In Option II, the US would withdrav; all of its
conventional forces from Europe in accordance with a
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carefully planned timetable. This would leave the
remaining fourteen NATO members to assume all of the
conventional roles. The US would then join with the
United Kingdom and France, assuming France would agree to
such a proposal, to provide NATO's strategic nuclear
umbrella. In all likelihood, the French would probably
take a much more active role in the alliance. Although the
French left (labor unions in particular) would oppose such
a move, it is extremely difficult to foresee the French
government giving de facto NATO leadership to the FRG.
This option would not be a feasible choice from the
European viewpoint. Presuming that the Western allies
retained the will not to submit to Soviet domination, NATO
would have to be restructured or a new defensive military
organization utilizing the present NATO infrastructure,
minus the US, would have to be created. This reorganiza-
tion or restructuring could be handled under the auspices
of the Eurogroup, which was formed with NATO approval in
1968 after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. [Ref.
172] Composed of eleven members (the US, Canada, France,
and Iceland are not members), the Eurogroup' s basic aim is
to strengthen the NATO Alliance by seeking to ensure that
the European contribution to the common defense is as
strong and cohesive as possible. It annually develops a
program of force improvements and mutual assistance with
individual nations contributing infrastructure funds.
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[Ref. 173] This organization seems particularly well
organized and structured to define new roles and missions
assuming this option was implemented.
This option, however, would have a significant impact
on the Europeans as it is doubtful that European political
consensus could be reached with Eurogroup assistance.
This would be an absolute necessity before any agreements
in the political arena could be considered. To do this,
the present differences in language and culture, which
were not a major problem under US leadership, would have to
be overcome to some degree and historical antipathies
would have to be dispelled. However, the most obvious
impact would be the loss of US military forces. Although
the US provides only 10 percent of NATO ground forces,
25 percent of NATO air forces, and 20 percent of NATO
naval forces, these US forces are well-equipped by
European standards. They are also regarded by most
military observers as the best trained and organized
forces in NATO today. [Ref. 174] West European replace-
ment of manpower alone would be a severe political problem,
Increased European conscription would be political
suicide unless detente totally collapsed. Even more
importantly, replacement of the sophisticated technology
removed by the US would be extremely expensive and more
than likely beyond the present capability of the European
military industrial complex's ability. However, at this
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moment in time, considering Soviet problems in
Afghanistan, China and Eastern Europe, it simply does not
seem likely that the Warsaw Pact is planning to attack
Western Europe in the immediate future.
This option also envisions some sort of US, UK, and
French strategic nuclear umbrella and there is an obvious
question that springs from this. Would the US portion of
the umbrella be perceived as being credible if there were
not any in-place US conventional forces? Under these
conditions, a war in Europe may not be perceived as a
direct threat to the American homeland. Therefore, our
political elite may not be willing to risk the loss of
Washington in retaliation for a Soviet nuclear attack on
Frankfurt, London, or Paris. Thus while the stated goal
of this option would be to retain the strategic nuclear
umbrella over Europe, it is very doubtful that either the
West Europeans or the Soviets would view this as a valid
deterrent upon the completion of the US withdrawal. At a
major conference, which was held in Brussels in September
of 1979 and co-sponsored by the Atlantic Institute for
International Affairs and NATO, former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger made a statement concerning the overall
strategic nuclear balance which seemingly supports the
above thoughts concerning US credibility. Dr. Kissinger's




And therefore I would say—what I might not say in
office—that our European allies should not keep
asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we
cannot possible mean or if we do mean, we should
not want to execute because if we execute, we risk
the destruction of civilization. Our strategic
dilemma is not solved by verbal reassurances; it
requires redesigning our forces and doctrine. There
is no point in complaining about declining American
will, or criticizing this or that American administra-
tion, for we are facing an objective crisis and it
must be remedied. [Ref. 175]
In addition, the implementation of this option would
force the US to completely re-evaluate its military
strategy and requirements for defense. Once the vast
majority of the approximately 300,000 [Ref. 176] US troops
were withdrawn from Europe, it is doubtful that the US
government, over a lengthy period of time, could maintain
continued public support for a large defease establishment
in the absence of European ties and ever-competing
domestic demands. This may even be true if over half of
these soldiers were re-deployed to areas such as the
Persian Gulf, Egypt, or Israel.
C. OPTION III
The third option has the US remaining in a NATO
conventional role while at the same time significantly
reducing current US conventional force postures. This US
reduction could be extremely flexible, ranging anywhere
from 25 to 50 percent, over a period of up to ten years in
consonance with increased European force modernization and
the progressively greater Europeanization of the alliance's
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infrastructure. The actual number of troops to be with-
drawn would naturally be dependent on the perceived world-
wide Soviet and/or Warsaw Pact threat, potential European
force modernization, and the requirments to meet the half
war strategy. The current NATO strategies of forward
defense and flexible response would be retained. The
strategic nuclear umbrella would again be provided by the
US, UK, and France.
The West European outcry to announcement of plans for
a partial withdrawal of US conventional forces would not
be as deafening as the previous option's. Nevertheless, it
would still be deafening. Yet while this option suffers
from some of the same problems as Option II, it does have
distinct advantages for both the West Europeans and the
US in four specific areas. First, the US would continue to
play a significant role in NATO. France would be more
inclined to participate in NATO military planning and the
European nations would provide replacements for US
military leaders in the more significant NATO military
positions. Secondly, the credibility of the US strategic
nuclear capability would be greatly enhanced over Option
II 's due to the continued presence of US conventional
troops on European soil. It would also help to reduce
European fears concerning US willingness to respond
strategically in the event of a Soviet attack. Thirdly,
the European nations ' defense expenditures would not have
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to be increased as significantly as in the second option.
While they should in all likelihood be greater than
presently planned, the Europeans could conceivably opt not
to increase defense expenditures at all because of US
forces and a credible nuclear capability. It would be
their decision. Fourth and finally, since many of
Europe's national interests are similar to US national
interests (particularly in the Persian Gulf area) , a
partial US conventional force withdrawal to better protect
US interests would have the same beneficial effect on
European national interests.
The idea to reduce US troop strengths in NATO is not a
new one. The most celebrated attempt, the Mansfield
Amendment, would have required large-scale troop with-
drawals in 196 8. However, the then Senate Majority Leader
decided not to culminate the amendment process after the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. He stated on August 22,
1968, that: "Because of this invasion, it appears to me
that we have no choice but to maintain our present
position." [Ref. 177] In 1961, the Kennedy Administration
also sought to decrease the NATO troop commitment in an
effort to alleviate a growing balance of payments problem.
However, this troop reduction did not take place either as
the FRG agreed to help reduce the deficit by annually
purchasing $600 million worth of military equipment from
the US. [Ref. 178] In the late 1960s, NATO troop
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reductions were rumored, although they never took place,
because of the Nixon Doctrine which called for reduced
foreign commitments. [Ref. 179] In an effort not to reduce
NATO troop levels, the 1973 Jackson-Nunn Amendment made it
law that: "The President will seek through negotiations
with US allies direct payments to the US to offset the
yearly balance of payments deficit caused, in part, by the
cost of overseas troops. If the cost of stationing US
troops in NATO countries amounted to 10 percent of the
balance of payments deficit, the President would be
directed to ask for contributions equal to 10 percent of
the deficit." Five hours after this vote, the US Senate,
amid one of the most intensive administration lobbying
efforts of the 93d Congress, voted down Senators Cranston
and Mansfield's efforts to reduce the US overseas troop
commitment by 40 percent over a three year period. This is
one reason for the substantial arms sales from the US to
West European countries in recent years. [Ref. 180] More
recently, the Director of the Center for Defense and
Strategic Studies in Paris, Jean-Paul Pigasse, has
suggested a recasting of the Atlantic Alliance and the
dissolving of NATO in its present form. His suggestion,
which would remove all US forces if implemented, certainly
implies that NATO Europe has the potential to accomplish
more in the area of defense and reinforces my previous
statements pertaining to European political will. Briefly/
134

Pigasse's case for a truly European defense system is
summarized below:
Alone among the world's centers of power, Western
Europe has failed to muster a common defense
commensurate with its needs and with the prize that
it represents in the international arena. This
failure is in large part the legacy of three decades
of security dependence, as well as a sense of
resignation spawned by keen consciousness of
vulnerabilities and the power equation on the
continent. Yet, given the political will, Europe's
assets could be assembled into an impressive defense
posture—one that could be enhanced substantially
through a rational integration and coordination of
relevant resources. Needed also is a unifying concept
of European strategy keyed to a changing scenario of
salient threats, particularly with respect to vital
European interests in the broader global domain.
[Ref. 181]
This option would continue the public perception of the
US historical and cultural ties with Western Europe while
at the same time allowing defense expenditures to stay
within the realm of reality when matched with available
manpower, production capability, and competing domestic
requirements. Because of this, the US would be able to
modify its conventional force posture more in consonance
with its one and a half war strategy. At the present time,
the US could credibly increase its presence and role in
other areas of the world deemed critical because of their
possession of much needed petroleum or natural resources.





Option IV would continue our present policy with the
same level of force commitments emphasizing the Carter
goals of increased defense expenditures in conjunction
with our European allies. While this would also be a
satisfactory option from an European viewpoint, it would
not solve the basic problem. The US would remain virtually
paralyzed to meet the requirements of the one and a half
war strategy further exacerbating future efforts to insure
the availability of petroleum and raw materials. It is
also unrealistic, even under the Reagan Administration, to
assume that the American public or congress would respond
to the gargantuan defense budget required to have a
credible one and a half war stategy as that strategy is
enunciated today. Although President Reagan has called
for an increase of $4.3 billion in the FY 1982 Defense
Budget (up from the Carter proposal of $181.5 to $135.8
billion) , he is a firm believer that the government must
spend and tax less. Ke recently told the US Congress:
"The taxing power of government must be used to provide
revenues for legitimate government purposes. It must not
be used to regulate the economy or bring about social
change." [Ref. 182] Although implementation of this
budget will make it easier for the new administration to
meet its NATO commitment for a three percent increase in
real terms, it may not provide the funds necessary
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to fully allow the one and a half war strategy to become
a reality. The more important hidden problem is that
future US Defense Budgets, which are now forecasted to
increase by $63.1 billion in FY 1986 (primarily for new
equipment), [Ref. 183] could bring about a return to the
social unrest witnessed in the 1960s. The key, therefore,
may be to bring about a solution utilizing both increased
defense expenditures and a reallocation of present
resources to limit defense expenditures below the social
boiling point.
E. COMPARISON OF THE OPTIONS
It is now possible to look at how the four options
presented would impact on our predominant national interest
to prevent or thwart any attack on the American homeland or
the basic elements of its economic and security systems.
I have previously defined the six most important US
national interests as being:
1. the permanent maintenance of US national survival
(i.e., territorial integrity);
2. the permanent maintenance of US domestic order;
3. the temporary maintenance of friendly political,
economic, and military ties with West European countries,
individually and collectively, with particular emphasis
on the NATO alliance;
4. the temporary maintenance of the present Middle East
balance of power with particular emphasis on Persian Gulf
oil routes and supplies
;
5. the temporary maintenance of the continued flow of
raw materials and oil from Africa and South America;
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6. the temporary maintenance of Egypt, Israel,
Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Spain's existence and
security.
What would be our capability to meet the requirements
of these overriding national interests should we follow
one of the four presented options as national policy?
The following matrix (See Table 25) depicts the impact of
these options on the six mentioned US national interests.
F. COMPARISON OF OPTION I
Implementation of this option would most assuredly
increase the allies and our capability and political will
to defend Western Europe . This would be especially true
if the Soviets only attacked with conventional forces.
It would also send a clear message to Moscow that the
current conventional force imbalance is no longer to be
tolerated by the NATO Community and raise the nuclear
threshold.
In terms of other American interests, this option
leaves much to be desired. The increased efforts in
Western Europe would logically detract from most of our
other interests unless NATO assumed, which it is unlikely
to, new roles in other geographical areas. The number and
type of options available to the US National Command
Authorities in the event of a global crisis would also be
reduced. The current quantitatively unacceptable assets
available to maintain the Mid-East balance of power,
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and security, would be significantly reduced numerically.
It would also reduce US capabilities to defend its own
territorial integrity and freedom by attack from areas
other than Europe. The increased budget required to
station additional troops and equipment in the NATO area
would also decrease the amount available to the domestic
sector thus reducing the likelihood of maintaining domestic
order at home significantly considering the current
proposed FY 1982 US Budget cuts and future proposed defense
budgets
.
G. COMPARISON OF OPTION II
Implementation of this option definitely would limit
our capability and political will to defend Western Europe,
especially if the Soviets attacked only with conventional
forces. There is no evidence to support a US first use of
nuclear weapons, especially if there is no threat to the
American homeland. Consequently, our strategic nuclear
umbrella credibility is questionable at best. French and
British use of nuclear weapons most likely would be
thwarted by the USSR's tactical and strategic nuclear
capability.
This option would significantly increase our capability
to maintain free access to goods and markets throughout the
world. Once the US conventional forces were withdrawn, our
efforts could be focused on a series of regional alliances
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backed up by rapidly deployable forces located in the US or
in non-European overseas areas. The number and type of
options available to the US National Coirjr.and Authorities
in the event of a global crisis would be significantly
increased.
Under this option, I have listed our ability to main-
tain other allied existence and security and the Mid-East
balance of power as being significantly increased. While
we would be able to respond globally, several other factors
enter into the equation. The withdrawal of our conventional
forces from Europe along with our previous policy failures
in Iran and Vietnam may create a global impression that
the US is willing to allow our present as well as former
allies to "die on the vine" in the face of any significant
threat requiring a conventional US force presence. On the
other hand, if the world was truly multipolar in nature,
other power centers as well as the nations of the Third
World might see our withdrawal as logical as well as
representative of a US willingness to reorganize to meet
our worldwide commitments. A final factor in this
equation has to be the US Congressional and public response
were this option to be implemented. Given the US's
current and projected military shortfalls in manpower and
equipment as well as future continued pressure for greater
governmental spending on internal domestic programs, would
the US Congress and American public not argue for a
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reduced military strength if our conventional force
commitments to NATO were eliminated? Even if a majority
of the withdrawn troops were redeployed to other overseas
locations?
H. COMPARISON OF OPTION III
This option would still provide a credible US
conventional force commitment to the defense of Western
Europe, even if reduced by as much as 50 percent.
European defense integration would be enhanced. France
would in all likelihood rejoin the military side of NATO
and as a minimum the FRG would feel the need to increase
defense expenditures for conventional forces. The
strategic nuclear umbrella provided by the US, UK, and
France would be no less credible than it is today.
This partial US withdrawal from NATO would increase the
US ability to maintain the flow of resources, other allies
security, Mid-East balance of power, and US territorial
integrity and freedom. The presence of the withdrawn
forces on US soil, earmarked as "possible" reinforcements
for NATO, but also earmarked to meet other worldwide
requirements of the one and a half war strategy, would
provide the National Command Authorities needed flexibility
to maintain our access to all areas of the world, to
include the Persian Gulf.
While one could suggest that implementation of this
option would run the same risks as Option II as regards to
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our ability to meaningfully influence the world balance of
power. I believe the exact opposite to be true. The
retention of significant US conventional forces in Europe
(50 percent of today's commitment is still significant),
backed by a strong strategic nuclear force, would act as a
stabilizing factor to world order. While the European
nations would go through an initial shock period, the
retention of at least 50 percent of our forces would still
convey our willingness and concern to Europe. Remember, we
have only one troop division in Korea presently. Other
nations, especially the People's Republic of China (PRC)
,
knowing that the partial US redeployment was accomplished
to meet worldwide requirements and to stop Soviet
expansionism, would probably continue on their present
course. The availability of additional US troops for
worldwide deployment, while still maintaining forces in
Europe would cause Soviet planners to rethink any possible
thoughts of meandering into those areas defined as vital
to the US. I doubt that this is the case today even in the
light that neither Egypt or Israel has cleared the way for
permanent US base rights on their soils at this time.
[Ref. 184]
Thus this option possesses a high degree of potential
if the US is to implement the one and a half war strategy.
Defense expenditures could remain relatively stable by
redeployment of fixed conventional troop assets and our
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conventional forces could be reorganized to meet the
requirements of the strategy. Therefore, because of
reduced defense expenditures, the likelihood of maintaining
US domestic order would be increased.
I. COMPARISON OF OPTION IV
Option IV, which envisions continuation of the present
policy, simply means "more of the same" in all respects.
Our European allies, despite relative core NATO countries'
economic self-sufficiency and power potential, would not
be required to increase their defense expenditures or
commitment of forces any more than is presently
programmed.
Our interest in maintaining the Mid -East balance of
power, resource flow, and other allies existence and
security would continue to decrease. Enhancement of this
need can only be accomplished by having readily deployable
forces capable of meeting any contingency. Neither these
forces nor the necessary command and control elements are
presently in existence. The current Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, has
estimated that the US Air Force alone would need an
additional $10 billion above current budget projections to
meet its portion of the requirement. [Ref. 185]
Maintaining the US ' s current force commitment in Europe,
tied with increasing domestic pressures and the current
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financial crisis, will prevent us from meeting the
requirements of the one and a half war strategy, reducing
the flexibility of the National Command Authorities and
consequently jeopardizing our ability to maintain our other
national interests throughout the world.
Finally, continuation of the status quo would produce
no change in our ability to meaningfully influence the
world balance of power. There is little doubt that we are
moving into a multipolar world. With our current commitment
to Europe, we are seemingly unable to influence a large
percentage of the nations of the world. The recent crises
in Afghanistan, Iran, and Angola have provided testimony
as to our lack of influence. The failure of even our
West European allies to support US economic sanctions
against the USSR or our proposed boycott of the 1980
Summer Olympics in Moscow is further evidence of our
declining status.
There is nothing in the geographical catalogue for
19 79... that would suggest the status quo could begin
to meet our needs as a democratic nation dedicated
to the ideals of freedom. [Ref. 186]
This trend of declining US influence in the world can
be predicted to continue if we continue our present
commitment of conventional forces to Western Europe, while
at the same time pronouncing our willingness to protect
other areas of the world. And it is highly unlikely that
we will have the necessary manpower, equipment, or
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financial resources to meet that two-pronged capability in
the immediate future if we continue our present course.
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VII. SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSIONS
NATO has proven itself to be a most stable and
successful organization for peace. However, the world
today is far different from when the alliance was formed
thirty-two years ago, and many relationships have changed.
The likelihood of war in Europe is considered to be low.
The Finlandization of Western Europe could probably only
occur if our current allies felt totally isolated from the
US economy and its military might. Strategic nuclear
parity is a reality. World requirements for petroleum and
other non-renewable raw materials have steadily increased
with industrialization. This has created an extremely
volatile sphere of competition between the world's
industrialized nations. And finally, the military
conventional force technological gap between the US and
USSR has narrowed significantly due to the USSR's
increased defense spending.
While the world has changed dramatically, I believe
our primary national security goal (which revolves around
our permanent and temporary national interests) , to
prevent or thwart any hostile attack on the American
mainland or the basic elements of its security and
economic systems, has remained basically unchanged. I
also feel that the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine with
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its requirements to pursue a credible one and a half war
strategy makes it mandatory that we reanalyze our conven-
tional force commitment to NATO.
President Reagan's Administration has brought to the
surface a powerful groundswell of US public opinion that
the US must reassert its power. Yet even with this
powerful groundswell, it is doubtful, in my opinion, that
the US currently possesses the resources necessary to meet
the worldwide commitments of the one and a half war
strategy. In plain English, the capability to credibly
meet any half war strategy with noncommitted NATO forces
does not exist. Additionally, as US Army enlistments
continue to fall short of their goals and the cost of
military equipment and salaries rise, the proposed Reagan
Administration's increased defense budgets (which may
certainly help to meet the requirements of the half war
strategy) will probably, if they haven't already, face a
stiff challenge from competing domestic needs in the
future. It is developing into a classic example of guns
versus butter and forcing the current administration to
make some extremely hard decisions.
A solution to part of the problem exists. The with-
drawal of 50 percent of our in-place conventional forces
from Western Europe, if accomplished within ten years in
accordance with a carefully planned timetable and co-
ordinated fully with our allies, would provide both
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military planners and the National Command Authorities
with additional and possibly sufficient resources to
provide the necessary options and flexibility needed to
credibly put the one and a half war strategy into
operation. It might also allow the government to reduce
additional unplanned defense spending by simply giving new
roles to already fixed assets. While an initial European
outcry against such a move would certainly occur, I think
General George S. Brown has put the problem into proper
perspective when he stated:
It is difficult to quantify the stabilizing influence
our (in-place) forces have in Europe or the destabilizing
influence which would result from their absence or
appreciable reduction. [Ref. 187]
As Western Europe has developed from World War II, it
has attained a large measure of economic and political
stability. It has evolved into a major power center.
The US, meanwhile, has seen a decline in its ability to
defend its changing national interests. This thought was
recently reinforced by General Volney F. Warner, shortly
before he retired as the Commanding General of Readiness
Command, when he stated: "The forces (now available) are
committed. We simply can't continue to draw circles on
the map, wish that we had a command that could deal with
it and hope that it can get there when. . .perhaps it can't."
[Ref. 188] A 50 percent reduction of US conventional
forces presently stationed in Europe would not lead to a
conventional war with the Soviets. This is because a
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considerable number of US conventional forces (approxi-
mately 150,000) would still be present on the continent
acting as a "tripwire" to activate US nuclear weapons, if
necessary. An attack on Western Europe would still be
considered an attack on the US. Best of all from a West
European standpoint, the West Europeans would have a
choice. They could further upgrade their present
conventional force posture or they could continue with the
presently planned modest improvements. Best of all from a
US standpoint, the withdrawal would allow the US to
reorganize its present assets to meet the requirements
dictated by our national interests and save monies that
would have had to come from the domestic sector if
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